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Constitutional Parenthood
Michael J. Higdon*
ABSTRACT: Despite having recognized the constitutional rights of parents
almost a hundred years ago, the Supreme Court has not weighed in on the
subject of who qualifies as a “parent” under the Fourteenth Amendment in
30 years. In light of the Court’s silence, the states have been forced to
individually grapple with the issue of constitutional parenthood—a task
made exponentially more difficult by the fact that the last 30 years have
ushered in an avalanche of change when it comes to the American family.
With advances in assisted reproduction, the legalization of same-sex
marriage, and the increased frequency of divorce, remarriage and
cohabitation, states now regularly encounter claims of parental identity that
30 years ago would have been unimaginable. Nonetheless, the states have
persevered, adopting a number of approaches to deal with these increasingly
thorny issues. The problem, however, is that the constitutional protections that
are afforded parents now vary by state. Moreover, some states have defined
“parent” in a way that discriminates against families that do not comport
with that state’s conception of the “ideal” family. To solve this problem, this
Article makes two proposals. First, the Supreme Court must offer more
guidance on how states may define constitutional parenthood. Although a
definitive definition of the term is both impractical and unrealistic, the Court
can and should delineate the outer boundaries of that constitutional
standard. Second, taking a cue from some of the tests developed by the states,
this Article proposes what exactly those boundaries should be so as to help craft
a definition of constitutional parenthood that is more responsive to and
protective of the 21st century family.
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“Constitutions fail when they ignore our nature.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Problems arise when the Supreme Court interprets constitutional rights
in such a way that states are left uncertain as to the exact reach of those rights.
Consider, for instance, in 2002, when the Supreme Court ruled that it is a
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment to execute defendants who are mentally handicapped.2 Despite
recognizing that “there is serious disagreement” as to “which offenders are in
fact” entitled to this protection, the Court nonetheless left “to the State[s] the
task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction
upon [their] execution of sentences.”3 In other words, the Court charged the
states with implementing this ban, including how to define the very term
“mentally handicapped.” In so doing, the Court’s opinion “created a maze of
statutory and judicial schemes for the protection of the intellectually

1.
2.
3.

PHILEMON BLISS, OF SOVEREIGNTY 17 (1885).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
Id. at 317 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416–17 (1986)).
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disabled.”4 More specifically, by deputizing the individual states, the Court’s
decision led to a system in which those “[w]ho actually enjoy[] the benefit of
those protections varies by state, and the amount of proof defendants must
make to garner that protection is similarly varied.”5 Even more troubling was
the fact that some states applied the Court’s directive so restrictively that
individuals with questionable cognitive abilities were nonetheless being
sentenced to death.6 For that reason, the Court would soon have to issue
another opinion on this topic, clarifying that, in determining whether a
defendant qualifies as mentally handicapped, states could not simply rely on
a bright-line IQ test threshold requirement.7 Three years later, as states
continued to experiment with how to define the term, the Court weighed in
once again, this time holding that states must use legitimate medical
diagnostic tools when determining whether a defendant was mentally
handicapped.8 Thus, within a short period of time, the Supreme Court would
issue three separate opinions on how states must define “mental handicap”
for purposes of ascertaining a defendant’s constitutional rights.
A similar, yet unresolved issue stems from the way states may define
“parent.” Like the mentally handicapped, the Constitution provides
protections to parents—in this instance, under the Fourteenth Amendment.9
In fact, the Supreme Court has gone so far as to characterize the
constitutional rights of parents to the care and upbringing of their children
as being “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized
by this Court.”10 But who qualifies as a parent? Despite the fact that the Court
first recognized the constitutional rights of parents in the mid-1920s,11 the
Court, in sharp contrast to the Supreme Court’s guidance on the definition
of “mental handicap,” has not weighed in on the issue of parental identity in
over a quarter of a century.12 The Court’s reticence might be understandable
if it had already put forth a satisfactory or even a workable definition of that
4. Ethan A. Wilkinson, Article, Eighth Amendment Protections in Capital Proceedings Against the
Intellectually Disabled: Assessing State Methods of Class Protection Through the Lens of Hall v. Florida, 40
L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 321, 342 (2016).
5. Id.
6. See Penny J. White, Treated Differently in Life but Not in Death: The Execution of the Intellectually
Disabled After Atkins v. Virginia, 76 TENN. L. REV. 685, 692–710 (2009) (noting the varying state
policies regarding execution of the mentally handicapped).
7. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014).
8. See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050–51 (2017).
9. See infra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
10. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
11. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923), is credited as being the first case to
recognize the fundamental right of parents. There, when discussing the Liberty Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court stated that, “[w]ithout doubt, it denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to [among other things,] establish a
home and bring up children.” Id. at 399.
12. See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (the last case to do so).
See infra notes 112–30 and accompanying text.
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term. When it comes to constitutional “parenthood,” however, that simply is
not the case. Instead, the Supreme Court has typically deferred to state court
determinations of parental identity when adjudicating those individual’s
constitutional rights.13
Of course, for much of our nation’s history, the Court would have had
little to say on the topic given that parenthood determinations were tied
almost exclusively to marriage and, thus, the identity of a child’s parents was
rarely in dispute.14 In essence, the woman who gave birth to the child was the
mother, and that woman’s husband was the father.15 If the mother was not
married, then the child was regarded as having no legal parents.16 Beginning
in the late 1960s, however, the law began to recognize that a parent-child
relationship could exist outside of marriage.17 Consequently, the question of
parenthood became more complex, requiring the Court to weigh in.
Therefore, in a quintet of cases, all of which were brought by nonmarital
fathers, the Supreme Court did just that—suggesting that there are indeed
some limits to the state’s ability to define legal parenthood.18 It is only within
the nonmarital, biological father context, however, that the Court has offered
any guidance on the broader topic of constitutional parenthood. In fact, the
last case in the quintet was in 1989—almost 30 years ago.19
The Court’s sustained silence is particularly problematic in light of the
dramatic changes to the American family during that time. These changes
have raised a number of questions that, 30 years ago, would have been
unheard of.20 These societal changes fall into three broad categories, and
each further complicates the issue of parental identity.
First, advances in assisted reproduction have expanded the number of
individuals who can play a role in conceiving a single child.21 Imagine, for
13. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2004) (dismissing
action brought by biological father on behalf of son given that the mother, by virtue of a state
court order, had sole legal custody); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 171 (1944) (treating
aunt, who under state law was the child’s legal custodian, as a constitutional parent).
14. See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185,
1193 (2016) (“Traditionally, marriage defined the scope of state-recognized parenting.”).
15. Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637,
644 (1993) (“A child’s mother was the woman who bore the child. Biology—including both
genetics and the processes of pregnancy and birth—was paramount and decisive.” (footnote
omitted)); Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 440
(2007) (“[T]raditionally, in the context of marriage, a father’s rights derive from his relationship
with the mother.”); see also infra note 59 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part II.
19. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 110 (1989).
20. See David D. Meyer, The Constitutionality of “Best Interests” Parentage, 14 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 857, 857 (2006) (“Judges and legislators around the country are wrestling with the
question [of parentage] as never before.”).
21. See infra Part III.A.
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instance, an infertile couple acquires sperm from a sperm donor, uses that
sperm to fertilize an egg provided by an egg donor, and then implants that
fertilized egg in a gestational surrogate with the expectation that the surrogate
will turn the child over to the commissioning couple after birth. In such a
scenario—which is far from uncommon—the resulting child would owe its
existence to the coordinated efforts of five individuals.22 But who among them
would qualify as that child’s legal parents?
Second, the legal recognition of same-sex marriage has posed additional
complications for parenthood. As the Court recognized in Obergefell v. Hodges,
“hundreds of thousands of children are presently being raised by [same-sex]
couples.”23 However, because medical science currently does not permit two
people of the same gender to conceive, children of same-sex couples will
have—at most—a biological connection with only one adult member of the
family. What then is the legal status of the other adult who does not have a
biological connection to the child? Is that person a “parent?” Legally, can a
child even have two mothers or two fathers? Finally, issues of parenthood have
also become more complicated through the rise in both divorce and
nonmarital cohabitation.24 Specifically, as adult relationships become less
formal and more short-term, it is not uncommon for children to have “legal
strangers” come into their lives, occupy a parental role, and in the process,
develop strong emotional ties with the child—a phenomenon many have
come to refer to as “psychological parentage.”25 Given, however, the lack of a
biological or legal connection to the child, can such an individual ever
become a “parent?” And, if so, how does such recognition impact the parental
rights of the child’s biological parents?
These are but a few of the complex questions relating to parental identity
that the states have been forced to address. Given the lack of any meaningful
guidance from the Supreme Court, the states have had to independently
determine how these changes impact constitutional parenthood. After all, the
Court has only addressed the subject of parental identity in the context of
nonmarital fathers, a factual setting unlike those the state courts are currently

22. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the
Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 355 (1991) (“We now live in an era where a child
may have as many as five different ‘parents.’”). Or perhaps more than five. See Jessica R. Hoffman,
Essay, You Say Adoption, I Say Objection: Why the Word War Over Embryo Disposition Is More Than Just
Semantics, 46 FAM. L.Q. 397, 401 (2012) (“A legal ramification of ART is that there could
conceivably be six ‘parents’ to a given embryo. One embryo could have a sperm donor, egg
donor, surrogate carrier, surrogate’s husband, and two intended parents.”).
23. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
24. See infra Part III.C.
25. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 946 (1984)
(“Psychological parents are adults who provide for the physical, emotional, and social needs of
the child, needs normally satisfied by the child’s nuclear family.” (footnote omitted)).
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encountering.26 Not surprisingly, then, the states have developed widely
disparate standards for defining “parent,” meaning an individual may
currently qualify as a parent in one state but not another.27 Therefore, a
person’s ability to claim parenthood and its attendant constitutional
protections has become dependent upon how tolerant and inclusive that
person’s state is when it comes to these new forms of parenting.
The Supreme Court has already made clear that “we cannot leave to the
States the formulation of the authoritative laws, rules, and remedies designed
to protect people from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed
rights.”28 As to the constitutional rights that flow from parenthood, however,
that is precisely what is happening. Of course, given that the law of domestic
relations has long been viewed as the province of state law,29 the fact that states
would define “parent” differently is to be expected and, to an extent, entirely
appropriate. States, for instance, remain free to define such things as the age
of consent, the procedures for adoption, and how property is to be divided at
divorce.30 However, for those aspects of family law that implicate
constitutional protections, the state’s ability to regulate is more
circumscribed—such regulations must comport with all relevant
constitutional safeguards.31 Marriage provides a helpful example of this
distinction. Marriage is an institution over which the states have historically
enjoyed broad legislative authority, including such determinations as the age
at which one can wed and whether a formal ceremony is required. At the same
time, marriage is also a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and as such, state efforts to restrict access to marriage have been repeatedly
struck down as unconstitutional.32

26. See infra Part III.
27. Meyer, supra note 20, at 880 (“At present, parentage law is growing more incoherent
because of ill-considered responses by courts and legislatures to new methods of scientific proof
of paternity, breakthroughs in reproductive technology, and changes in family living patterns.”).
28. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967).
29. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (describing family law as “an area that has long
been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States”); Courtney G. Joslin, Federalism and
Family Status, 90 IND. L.J. 787, 798 (2015) (“[I]t is true that the federal government often defers
to or incorporates state family status rules.”).
30. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (noting that “the laws of marriage
and domestic relations are concerns traditionally reserved to the states”).
31. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) (“[T]he Federal Constitution
supersedes state law and provides even greater protection for certain formal family relationships.”).
32. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (striking down prohibition on
same-sex marriage); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (finding that a Missouri statute was
unconstitutional because it restricted marriage for inmates); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978) (finding that a Wisconsin statute was unconstitutional because it restricted marriage for
residents with outstanding child support obligations); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding
that Virginia’s statute prohibiting marriage based upon racial classification was unconstitutional).
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Parenthood is very much like marriage in that it is not only a fundamental
right, it is also an unenumerated right.33 Thus, because such “rights provide
no inherent mechanism of interpretation,”34 the Court must supply some
basis for defining not only the right itself, but also the rightholders if the states
are to understand the constitutional boundaries within which they can
affirmatively legislate.35 In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court did just that
when it spoke to the definition of “marriage,” making clear that the states
cannot constitutionally exclude same-sex marriages from that term.36 But
what about “parenthood?” Although the Court has not said much on the issue
of parental identity, what it has said reveals that there are indeed
constitutional limits on who can be excluded from the definition of parent. It
is the position of this Article, however, that more is needed—much more.
Specifically, those currently understood limits, when applied to the myriad of
familial arrangements existing today, are entirely insufficient to protect 21stcentury parentage.
Of even greater concern, however, is how the lack of guidance has
allowed some states to openly discriminate against forms of parentage the
state has deemed contrary to that state’s idea of family.37 As one scholar has
aptly noted, the “recognition of the fact of greater family diversity does not
translate into accepting or valuing all such diversity.”38 Indeed, in the wake of
Obergefell, a number of states have attempted to offset the rights same-sex
couples achieved through marriage equality by simultaneously constricting
their ability to qualify as parents to the children of those marriages.39
Professor Douglas NeJaime predicted as much in 2016 when he warned that
“there is certainly cause for concern that, going forward, marriage equality
will lead courts and legislatures to limit nonmarital paths to legal parentage
for nonbiological parents.”40 Furthermore, it is not just same-sex marriage
that is prompting states to become more restrictive in how they define
parenthood. Developments in assisted reproduction and the recognition of
33. See David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 800, 834 (1986) (“The right to marriage is not a textually specified one, so its existence
must depend on a conception of unenumerated reserved rights . . . .”).
34. John F. Basiak, Jr., Inconsistent Levels of Generality in the Characterization of Unenumerated
Fundamental Rights, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 406 (2005).
35. Anthony Miller, The Case for the Genetic Parent: Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, Lehr, and
Michael H. Revisited, 53 LOY. L. REV. 395, 398 (2007) (“The power to determine who can exercise
a right is as important as the determination of the right itself.”).
36. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (“The Constitution, however, does not permit the State to bar
same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.”).
37. Cf. Hendricks, supra note 15, at 433 (“[T]he rights of parenthood would erode if states
could deny them merely by changing the legal definition of parents.”).
38. Linda C. McClain, A Diversity Approach to Parenthood in Family Life and Family Law, in
WHAT IS PARENTHOOD: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY 41, 49 (Linda C. McClain
& Daniel Cere eds., 2013).
39. See infra Part III.B.
40. NeJaime, supra note 14, at 1249.
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psychological parentage has likewise prompted similar attempts “to preserve
the old order”41 of conceptualizing the parent-child relationship. As Professor
Janet Dolgin describes, “[t]o safeguard treasured forms in the face of
changing values and structures, courts have considered, and then sometimes
shifted or defined anew, the key symbols through which families are discussed
and understood.”42
Thus, the aim of this Article is twofold. The first is doctrinal. Quite simply,
it is incumbent on the Supreme Court to provide greater insight on the
meaning of “parent” as that term has been used to describe and fashion the
corresponding constitutional right. Admittedly, parenthood is a complex
concept and one that does not lend itself—especially in modern society—to a
single definition. Nonetheless, like all constitutional rights, it must necessarily
possess some core limits that bind the states. Without additional guidance
from the Court, however, even those basic boundaries cannot be sketched,
leaving states to define parenthood so disparately that the availability of those
constitutional protections varies significantly by state. The second aim of this
article is normative; it proposes a new standard for constitutional parenthood
that meaningfully protects the expanded class of individuals now claiming
parental status, while safeguarding the state’s legitimate interests in
protecting the well-being of its children. After all, recognizing too many
individuals as “parent” to a given child, “will increase the possibility of conflict
among the adults that will harm children.”43 As Professor Jeffrey Shulman has
argued, “[t]he best interests of the child are not served by granting rights to
more and more parental claimants or by creating new varieties of
constitutionally protected parenthood.”44
Although other scholars have noted the lack of any uniform definition of
constitutional parenthood,45 the few that have proposed a solution have done
so primarily by focusing on state solutions.46 This Article, although agreeing
41. Dolgin, supra note 15, at 639 (“The ideology of family has stubbornly resisted change.”);
see also infra Part III (describing different methods of reproduction that have developed in the
modern age, as well as resistance by some states to recognize new forms of parenthood).
42. Dolgin, supra note 15, at 640.
43. Josh Gupta-Kagan, Non-Exclusive Adoption and Child Welfare, 66 ALA. L. REV. 715, 742 (2015).
44. JEFFREY SHULMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARENT: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE
ENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE CHILD 205 (2014).
45. See, e.g., David D. Meyer, Partners, Care Givers, and the Constitutional Substance of Parenthood,
in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 47, 49 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006); Emily Buss, “Parental”
Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 635–36 (2002); Miller, supra note 35, at 398; Douglas NeJaime, The
Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2264 (2017); Jeffrey A. Parness, Federal Constitutional
Childcare Parents, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 965, 971–72 (2016).
46. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 45, at 636 (advocating a system “that affords the state
substantially more authority to assign parental identity where that identity is in dispute”);
NeJaime, supra note 45, at 2269–70 (“State legislatures can restructure parentage law in ways that
credit parenthood’s social dimensions, and state courts can apply parentage principles to
recognize as legal parents those who have committed to the work of parenting.”).
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that the states can continue to play a role in some regards, instead argues that
parental identity needs to begin with the Supreme Court. That solution is,
quite simply, a more contemporary definition of constitutional parenthood,
one that will better protect the rights of modern families. Additionally, this
Article is the first to propose what exactly that definition should be.
Specifically, using state approaches as a guide, this Article advocates for a
definition of constitutional parenthood that accounts not only for those who
share a biological connection to the child, but also those who were the
intended parents of the resulting child, regardless of biology. This Article
reaches that conclusion by following an analysis similar to the one the Court
took in Obergefell; namely, this Article deconstructs the fathers’ rights cases to
analyze the “essential attributes”47 of those decisions—attributes that likewise
mandate the inclusion of intentional parentage within the definition of
constitutional parenthood.48
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II introduces the fundamental right
of parents, focusing primarily on the fathers’ rights cases—a series of five cases
which mark the only time the Court has delved into the issue of who states
must include in their definitions of “parent.” Part III then looks at the years
that have elapsed since the Court last weighed in on the issue of parental
identity, surveying the various approaches the states have taken when applying
their state parentage laws to the evolving realities of American parenthood.
In Part IV, the Article argues that, after 30 years, the time is ripe for the Court
to turn once again to the issue of parental identity, so as to help shape a
standard that is not only more uniform but more protective of contemporary
family structures. Finally, this Article puts forth a new definition for
constitutional parenthood—one that helps better achieve familial equality,
yet one that also preserves the states’ ability to legislate in such a way as to
safeguard the wellbeing of their citizens.
II.

PARENTAL STATUS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

In 2000, Justice O’Connor declared, in her plurality opinion in Troxel v.
Granville, that “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court.”49 As the Supreme Court has made clear: “The child
47. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). In Obergefell, the Court concluded
that the fundamental right to marry must likewise include the right to same-sex marriage given
that “the basic reasons why the right to marry has been long protected . . . demonstrate that the
reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex
couples.” Id. at 2599.
48. See infra Part IV.A.
49. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). Despite O’Connor’s characterization,
however, the actual history behind the development of this right demonstrates that—unlike other
rights traditionally considered “fundamental”—its status is far less certain. Id. at 92 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Only three holdings of this Court rest in whole or in part upon a substantive
constitutional right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children—two of them from an
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is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations.”50 These constitutional protections include
the “right to the care, custody and companionship of [the] child as well as the
right to make decisions affecting the welfare of the child free from
government interference, except in compelling circumstances.”51 Thus,
beyond simply protecting a parent’s decision-making authority, the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects the emotional bonds that exist between
parent and child, effectively “prevent[ing] the state from seizing newborns
and distributing them to parents by some administrative scheme.”52 In other
words, there is no question that the Constitution protects the rights of parents.
The Constitution does not, however, define “parent.”53 Thus, that
definition must come from the Court, which has, in fact, issued five decisions
on this topic.54 However, the last of these cases was issued 30 years ago, and,
even then, as the remainder of this Part details, the Court’s treatment has
been episodic, with the result that the Court has never systematically
addressed the basic question of how parenthood should be defined for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.55
As an initial point, Supreme Court cases dealing with parental identity, in
contrast to parental rights, did not even arise until relatively recently.56 That
delay is hardly surprising, however, when one considers that, for much of our

era rich in substantive due process holdings that have since been repudiated.” (footnote
omitted)); see also SHULMAN, supra note 44, at 8 (describing the right as “tenuous” and noting
that “no Supreme Court holding supports this claim”—that the right is truly fundamental).
50. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
51. Katheryn D. Katz, Majoritarian Morality and Parental Rights, 52 ALB. L. REV. 405, 406
(1988) (footnote omitted); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply
nor hinder.”).
52. Hendricks, supra note 15, at 454.
53. Miller, supra note 35, at 398 (“While the United States Supreme Court has established that
the Constitution protects many parental rights, the Court has essentially left unresolved the issue of
who qualifies as a parent.”); see also Meyer, supra note 20, at 866 (“[W]hile the Constitution clearly
protects ‘parents’ rights,’ it does not clearly or necessarily say who a parent is.”).
54. See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
55. The same can be said of many constitutional rights related to family privacy. As David
Meyer has argued, “the Court has been content to let strands of doctrine emerge piecemeal.
Rights to abortion, contraception, marriage, kinship, and the custody and rearing of children
have, for the most part, sprung up independently of one another, only later converging into a
loosely recognized constellation of ‘family privacy’ rights.” David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family
Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 528 (2000).
56. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (discussing that Illinois made no
presumption of parental identity for unwed fathers).
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nation’s history, identifying an individual’s parents posed little difficulty.57
Historically, parenthood flowed from marriage—reductively, the wife was the
mother, and her husband was the father.58 Questions of motherhood never
arose because, due to the unavailability of in vitro fertilization, the biological
mother and the birth mother would have always been the same person.59 On
the other hand, the absence of genetic testing meant that one could never be
certain of the biological father’s identity. Nonetheless, the law solved that
problem by simply ignoring biology and instead linking fatherhood to
marriage.60 Thus, as one leading hornbook on the subject described it:
If a married woman gave birth to a child, her husband
was held to be the child’s father despite any evidence to the
contrary. When a husband went abroad for three years and returned
to find his wife with a month-old daughter, the law deemed the
daughter to be the husband’s child because “the privity between a
man and his wife cannot be known.”61
For nonmarital children, parenthood was likewise quite easy to
determine—the law simply viewed them as having no legal parents.62
Considered “filius nullius,” or “the child and heir of no one,” illegitimate
children had no legal relationship to either parent.63 As John Dewey explains,
“it was not understood to deny the fact of physiological begetting; it was
asserting that such [children] did not possess the specific rights which belong
to one who was filius, implying wedlock as a legal institution.”64
Starting in the late 1960s, however, the Supreme Court began striking
down laws that discriminated against nonmarital children. The first case to do
so was Levy v. Louisiana, in which the Court struck down a Louisiana statute
that prevented five nonmarital children from bringing an action for the

57. See Meyer, supra note 20, at 859 (“Until quite recently, parentage appeared to be a
‘settled category’ in the law.”).
58. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
59. It was not until 1978 that the first successful in vitro fertilization procedure occurred.
See Kevin Yamamoto & Shelby A.D. Moore, A Trust Analysis of a Gestational Carrier’s Right to Abortion,
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 97 (2001).
60. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 197 (1985) (“The law used matrimony to separate legal from spurious issue.”);
Miller, supra note 35, at 444 (“The law did not traditionally protect the rights of the genetic parent
simply because the child’s genetic parent could not be determined with certainty.”).
61. WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES INCLUDING TAXATION
AND FUTURE INTERESTS 34–35 (1988). Thus, historically, “[n]ature identifies mothers . . . .
[F]atherhood can only be presumed through a man’s relation to the child’s mother.” Dolgin,
supra note 15, at 644.
62. Judith Lynn Bick Rice, The Need for Statutes Regulating Artificial Insemination by Donors, 46 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1055, 1057 n.20 (1985) (“At common law, an illegitimate child had no legal parents.”).
63. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 253 & n.183 (1995)
(quoting GROSSBERG, supra note 60, at 197).
64. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 656 (1926).
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wrongful death of their mother.65 Using the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court concluded “that it is invidious to discriminate against [nonmarital
children] when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant
to the harm that was done the mother.”66 In a companion case, Glona v.
American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., the Court held that it was likewise
unconstitutional to prevent a biological parent from suing for the wrongful
death of a nonmarital child.67
In the years immediately following Levy and Glona, the Court continued
to invalidate longstanding statutes that discriminated against nonmarital
children.68 As a consequence, novel issues of paternity began to arise, forcing
states to address an issue it had never before really had to consider: Who
qualifies as a parent? After all, as illustrated by the Court’s holdings in Levy
and Glona, if nonmarital children had rights, then so too did nonmarital
parents. However, in the parental context, because the law could not look to
marriage to determine parentage, new means of identification were now
required. For nonmarital mothers, identification was quite simple—“[t]he
evidence of pregnancy and childbirth was irrefutable.”69 When it came to
identifying nonmarital fathers, however, the task was not so simple given that,
in contrast to the mother’s nine month gestation, “[o]nce a man has
contributed genetic material, his biological task is essentially complete.”70
Thus, there was nothing as obvious as pregnancy or birth to provide
assurances as to the identity of a child’s father, nor, at this time, was genetic
testing really an option.71 Thus, nonmarital fathers presented quite a
challenge to the states. Of course, even if a state could identify the biological
father, the question remained as to what rights he should hold and whether
biology alone was sufficient to entitle him to those rights.
As states experimented with how best to solve these problems, nonmarital
fathers began challenging state laws that they felt did not adequately
safeguard their parental rights. In Stanley v. Illinois, one such challenge quickly
made its way to the Supreme Court just four years after Levy and Glona opened

65. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1968).
66. Id. at 72 (footnote omitted). Notably, the Court reached this result despite the fact that
the law at issue “had history and tradition on its side.” Id. at 71.
67. Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75–76 (1968).
68. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977) (striking down an Illinois statute
that barred children from inheriting via intestacy from a nonmarital father); Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175–76 (1972) (striking down a Louisiana worker’s
compensation statute that discriminated on the basis of legitimacy).
69. Dolgin, supra note 15, at 644.
70. Sherry F. Colb, Words that Deny, Devalue, and Punish: Judicial Responses to Fetus-Envy?, 72
B.U. L. REV. 101, 103 (1992).
71. See Thomas H. Murray & Ross S. White, Genetic Privacy in the United States: Genetic
Exceptionalism, GINA, and the Future of Genetic Testing, in GENETIC PRIVACY: AN EVALUATION OF THE
ETHICAL AND LEGAL LANDSCAPE 253, 255 (Terry Sheung-Hung Kaan & Calvin Wai-Loon Ho eds.,
2013) (noting that the use of genetic testing to determine paternity did not emerge until the 1980s).
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the door to such questions.72 In that case, the Court would issue its first of five
opinions dealing with the rights of nonmarital fathers. There, the Supreme
Court was confronted with a state law that declared that “the children of
unwed fathers become wards of the State upon the death of the mother.”73
Pursuant to that law, Peter Stanley had lost his three nonmarital children to
the state when their mother died.74 At no time did he receive a hearing to
prove that he was a fit parent. Instead, under Illinois law, “the State, on
showing that the father was not married to the mother, need not prove
unfitness in fact, because it is presumed at law.”75 In other words, the state
simply did not regard an individual like Stanley to qualify as a parent:
“‘Parents,’ says the State, ‘means the father and mother of a legitimate child,
or the survivor of them; or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, and
includes any adoptive parent,’ but the term does not include unwed fathers.”76
Although the Court had previously appeared quite deferential to states’
definitions of parents,77 for the first time the Court found that a state had
crossed an unconstitutional line.
According to the Court, a father’s interest “in the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his . . . children” is “cognizable and
substantial.”78 More specifically, the Court held that “[t]he private interest
here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably
warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection.”79 The Court went on to find that, in terms of his due process
argument, the interests put forward by the state were insufficient to overcome
the liberty interest of a father in his children.80 Additionally, because the state
of Illinois did in fact allow hearings to “married parents, divorced parents,
and unmarried mothers,” the Court likewise ruled “that denying such a
hearing to Stanley and those like him while granting it to other Illinois parents
is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.”81 Finally, as to the
state’s freedom to define “parent” narrowly so as to exclude individuals like
Stanley, the Court quoted its earlier decision in Glona: “To say that the test of
equal protection should be the ‘legal’ rather than the biological relationship
72. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 645 (1972).
73. Id. at 646.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 650.
76. Id. (citation omitted).
77. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 161 (1944) (treating aunt as constitutional
parent by virtue of the fact that she was, under state law, the child’s legal custodian).
78. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651–52.
79. Id. at 651.
80. Id. at 658 (“[The State] insists on presuming rather than proving Stanley’s unfitness
solely because it is more convenient to presume than to prove. Under the Due Process Clause
that advantage is insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing when the issue at stake is the
dismemberment of his family.”).
81. Id. at 658.
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is to avoid the issue. For the Equal Protection Clause necessarily limits the
authority of a State to draw such ‘legal’ lines as it chooses.”82 Thus, by holding
that the law violated both the Equal Protection and the Due Process clause,
the Court made clear that there are indeed limits to how restrictively a state
may define the term “parent.”83
Although Stanley could be read to suggest that constitutional parenthood
flowed directly from biological parenthood, the Court would soon make clear
that the issue was not quite that simple. In 1978, the Court decided Quilloin
v. Walcott, a case that involved Leon Quilloin’s attempts to veto the adoption
of his biological child by the child’s stepfather, who had married the mother
in 1967 when the child was just three years of age.84 Quilloin and the child’s
mother were never married.85 Further, the child had been living with the
mother and stepfather since 1969.86 Under Georgia law, only the mother’s
consent was required for the stepparent adoption given that it involved a
nonmarital child.87 Thus, Quilloin’s objections to the adoption were without
legal effect, and the stepfather’s adoption petition was granted.88 Quilloin
subsequently brought suit, arguing that the Georgia law violated the Equal
Protection Clause in that it “denied him the rights granted to married parents,
and presumed unwed fathers to be unfit as a matter of law.”89
Despite the fact that his status as the child’s biological father was not in
dispute, the Court in a unanimous opinion ruled that the state could
constitutionally treat men like Quilloin differently from other fathers.
Specifically, the Court focused on Quilloin’s lack of involvement in the child’s
life, finding that in light of those facts, he was not similarly situated to marital
fathers, whose consent would have been required under Georgia law:
[H]e has never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and
thus has never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect
to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the
child. . . . In contrast, legal custody of children is, of course, a central
aspect of the marital relationship, and even a father whose marriage
has broken apart will have borne full responsibility for the rearing of

82. Id. at 652 (quoting Glona v. Am. Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75–76 (1968)).
83. See Hendricks, supra note 15, at 435 (“The core of Stanley is thus the Court’s recognition
that Stanley was, constitutionally, a parent, whose claim to his children could be overcome only
by a compelling state interest, such as his unfitness.”); Meyer, supra note 20, at 871 (“Implicit in
this holding, of course, was a judgment that unwed fathers such as Peter Stanley are
constitutionally entitled to state recognition as parents.”).
84. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 247 (1978).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 247 n.1. As the Court explained, “[t]he child lived with his maternal grandmother
for the initial period of the marriage.” Id.
87. Id. at 248 n.3 (“If the child be illegitimate, the consent of the mother alone shall suffice.”).
88. Id. at 247.
89. Id. at 250.
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his children during the period of the marriage. Under any standard
of review, the State was not foreclosed from recognizing this
difference in the extent of commitment to the welfare of the child.90
The Court pointed out that, although the Due Process Clause “would be
offended ‘[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family,
over the objections of the parents and their children,’”91 the facts of Quilloin’s
case failed to offer such a scenario: “Nor is this a case in which the proposed
adoption would place the child with a new set of parents with whom the child
had never before lived. Rather, the result of the adoption in this case is to give
full recognition to a family unit already in existence.”92 The Court did little to
distinguish the case from Stanley, merely noting that the previous case “left
unresolved the degree of protection a State must afford to the rights of an
unwed father in a situation, such as that presented here, in which the
countervailing interests are more substantial.”93
Just one year later, in Caban v. Mohammed, the Court issued its third
fathers’ rights opinion, ruling that a New York adoption statute, which
required the consent of nonmarital mothers but not nonmarital fathers, was
unconstitutional as applied to the facts of that case.94 Unlike the nonmarital
father in Quilloin, Mr. Caban had “manifested a significant paternal interest
in the child[ren]” by both living with and supporting them.95 Although the
Court recognized the state’s interest in promoting the adoption and
wellbeing of nonmarital children, it was nonetheless troubled by the degree
to which the law in question discriminated on the basis of gender—a “claim
[that] was not properly presented”96 in Quilloin:
The facts of this case illustrate the harshness of classifying unwed
fathers as being invariably less qualified and entitled than mothers
to exercise a concerned judgment as to the fate of their children.
[The New York law] both excludes some loving fathers from full
participation in the decision whether their children will be adopted
and, at the same time, enables some alienated mothers arbitrarily to
cut off the paternal rights of fathers. We conclude that this

90. Id. at 256. For similar reasons, the Court found no violation of the Due Process Clause,
noting that “this is not a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or sought, actual or legal
custody of his child.” Id. at 255.
91. Id. (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862–63 (1977) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 248.
94. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979).
95. Id. at 394.
96. Id. at 389 n.7. As the Court explained in Quilloin, “[i]n the last paragraph of his brief,
appellant raises the claim that the statutes make gender-based distinctions that violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Since this claim was not presented in appellant’s jurisdictional statement, we
do not consider it.” Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 253 n.13.
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undifferentiated distinction between unwed mothers and unwed
fathers, applicable in all circumstances where adoption of a child of
theirs is at issue, does not bear a substantial relationship to the
State’s asserted interests.97
Distinguishing its holding in Caban from Quilloin, the Court pointed out that,
in Quilloin, “we emphasized the importance of the appellant’s failure to act as
a father toward his children.”98 Thus, as Professor Janet Dolgin describes it,
“Caban suggests that a biological father’s paternal behavior will determine the
degree of protection the Constitution provides in safeguarding his
relationship with his biological child.”99
With the Supreme Court now having decided two cases in favor of
nonmarital, biological fathers and one against, the stage was set for the Court
to synthesize those opinions into one coherent standard—one that would
better answer the question of how exactly a nonmarital father acquires
constitutional rights to his biological children. The facts of Lehr v. Robertson
would provide a perfect opportunity to do just that, and indeed the Court’s
decision would prove to be a landmark case on the issue of parental
identity.100 Like the petitioner in Quilloin, Jonathan Lehr was a nonmarital
father who had played little role in the life of his child, Jessica.101 When Jessica
was just eight months old, her mother married another man, Richard
Robertson.102 When Jessica was two years old, “the Robertsons filed an
adoption petition” with the county court.103 Under New York law, Lehr was
not entitled to notice of the petition.104 After Robertson’s adoption petition
was granted, Lehr filed “a petition to vacate the order of adoption on the

97. Caban, 441 U.S. at 394.
98. Id. at 389 n.7.
99. Dolgin, supra note 15, at 657. Dolgin goes on to note, however, that “the language of
the opinion focuses on the fact that Caban ‘lived together as a natural family’ with Maria
Mohammed and their children rather than on the character of the relationship that Caban
affected with his children.” Id.
100. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 248–49 (1983).
101. Id. at 252 (“He did not live with appellee or Jessica after Jessica’s birth, he has never
provided them with any financial support, and he has never offered to marry appellee.”).
102. Id. at 250.
103. Id.
104. The law did require that notice be provided to those nonmarital fathers who had
registered with the putative father registry:
[T]hose who have been identified as the father on the child’s birth certificate, those
who live openly with the child and the child’s mother and who hold themselves out
to be the father, those who have been identified as the father by the mother in a
sworn written statement, and those who were married to the child’s mother before
the child was six months old.
Id. at 251. Lehr, however, did not fall into any of those categories. Id. at 251–52.
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ground that it was obtained by fraud and in violation of his constitutional
rights.”105
The Court began its analysis by noting that, when it comes to family law,
state law definitions typically govern and are “generally specified in statutory
enactments that vary from State to State.”106 The Court, however, was quick to
note “that the Federal Constitution supersedes state law and provides even
greater protection for certain formal family relationships.”107 With that
understanding, the Court turned to the merits of Lehr’s case, taking that
opportunity to revisit the previous fathers’ rights cases and clarify when
exactly a nonmarital father is entitled to constitutional protection.
As an initial point, the Court made clear that biological parentage is not
dispositive, ruling that “the mere existence of a biological link does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection.”108 Instead, the Court put forth what is
commonly referred to today as the “biology plus” doctrine.109 According to
the Court, “[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by ‘com[ing] forward to participate in the
rearing of his child,’ his interest in personal contact with his child acquires
substantial protection under the Due Process Clause.”110 In other words,
biological parenthood provides a nonmarital father with an incipient right,
one that will not fully develop until he takes sufficient steps to foster a parental
relationship with the child. Accordingly, the Court upheld the New York law
given that it “ha[d] adequately protected his opportunity to form such a
relationship.”111 In the Court’s view, the fact that Lehr never seized that
opportunity was nobody’s fault but his own.112
Whatever clarity Lehr provided, however, was short-lived. Six years later,
the Court would issue its final fathers’ right case, Michael H. v. Gerald D.—a
case that continues to call into question the precise reach of the biology plus
doctrine.113 In that case, Justice Scalia would begin his plurality opinion by

105. Id. at 253.
106. Id. at 256.
107. Id. at 257 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 261.
109. See Daniel C. Zinman, Note, Father Knows Best: The Unwed Father’s Right to Raise His Infant
Surrendered for Adoption, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 972 (1992) (using the phrase “biology plus” to
describe the Court’s test).
110. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (citation omitted) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
392 (1979) (alteration in original)).
111. Id. at 263.
112. The Court likewise rejected Lehr’s Equal Protection argument for this same reason,
finding that he and the mother were not similarly situated: “If one parent has an established
custodial relationship with the child and the other parent has either abandoned or never
established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a state from according
the two parents different legal rights.” Id. at 267–68 (footnote omitted).
113. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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declaring: “The facts of this case are, we must hope, extraordinary.”114 The
facts to which Scalia was referring involved the story of four people: The
biological mother, Carole; the biological father, Michael; their biological
child, Victoria; and the mother’s husband, Gerald, to whom Carole was
married and had been married throughout the events that gave rise to this
litigation.115 Carole had an extramarital affair with Michael, resulting in the
birth of Victoria.116 Despite the fact that Carole was married to Gerald,
Michael played an active role in Victoria’s life. The child referred to Michael
as “Daddy,” and he not only spent time with her, but also supported her
financially.117 Genetic testing proved that Michael was indeed Victoria’s
father. Gerald, however, was listed as the father on Victoria’s birth
certificate.118 Eventually Gerald and Carole reconciled, and ended Michael’s
visitation with Victoria.
In response, Michael filed an action in California to establish his
paternity and to gain formal visitation.119 California’s marital presumption,
however, provided that “the [child] of a wife cohabiting with her husband,
who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the
marriage.”120 Although one could rebut the presumption with genetic testing,
such an action could only be brought within the first two years of the child’s
life and, even then, only by the husband or the wife.121 Accordingly, an
individual like Michael, who was a stranger to the marriage, had no right to
challenge the paternity of a marital child. Thus, under California law, “[a]ll
parental rights, including visitation, were automatically denied by denying
Michael status as the father.”122
Michael filed an appeal, part of which argued that the California law
unconstitutionally infringed upon his substantive due process rights—
specifically, his “constitutionally protected liberty interest in his relationship
with Victoria.”123 Under Lehr, his argument would appear to have some merit.
After all, Michael was not only the biological parent of Victoria, but he had
also come forward and affirmatively acted as a parent for a significant portion

114. Id. at 113.
115. Id. at 113–14.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 143–44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 113 (plurality opinion).
119. Id. at 114.
120. Id. at 115 (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a) (West Supp. 1989)).
121. Id. at 115 (“The presumption may be rebutted by blood tests, but only if a motion for
such tests is made, within two years from the date of the child’s birth, either by the husband or,
if the natural father has filed an affidavit acknowledging paternity, by the wife.” (citing CAL. EVID.
CODE § 621(c)–(d))).
122. Id. at 119.
123. Id. at 121.
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of her early life.124 The plurality, however, put forth an exception: “Where,
however, the child is born into an extant marital family, the natural father’s
unique opportunity conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of the
husband of the marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for the State to give
categorical preference to the latter.”125 To justify its departure from Lehr, the
plurality noted that history and tradition—those areas to which the Court
typically looks to for identifying fundamental rights126—was entirely
insufficient to elevate Michael’s claimed liberty interest to that level:
What counts is whether the States in fact award substantive parental
rights to the natural father of a child conceived within, and born
into, an extant marital union that wishes to embrace the child. We
are not aware of a single case, old or new, that has done so. This is
not the stuff of which fundamental rights qualifying as liberty
interests are made.127
Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of the California court, leaving Michael
a legal stranger to the biological child he had previously parented.
Justice Stevens concurred in the plurality’s decision but nonetheless
wrote separately to make clear that he “would not foreclose the possibility that
a constitutionally protected relationship between a natural father and his
child might exist in a case like this.”128 In fact, Stevens noted that he only
joined Justice Scalia’s opinion because Stevens believed the California law in
question gave Michael the opportunity to obtain visitation rights to Victoria.129
In light of Steven’s concurrence, at least one scholar believes that Michael H.
was, essentially, an endorsement of the biology plus doctrine. Specifically, as
Professor Anthony Miller explains: “[I]t is apparent that a majority of the
Court in Michael H.—Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, White, the four
dissenters, along with Justice Stevens—favored constitutional protection for
the genetic participatory parent.”130 Nonetheless, other scholars have
attempted to synthesize the more restrictive plurality opinion in Michael H.
124. Id. at 143–44 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The evidence is undisputed that Michael,
Victoria, and Carole did live together as a family; that is, they shared the same household, Victoria
called Michael ‘Daddy,’ Michael contributed to Victoria’s support, and he is eager to continue
his relationship with her.”).
125. Id. at 129 (plurality opinion).
126. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (“[W]e have regularly
observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties
which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” (quoting Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977))).
127. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127.
128. Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring).
129. Id. (“Indeed, I am willing to assume for the purpose of deciding this case that Michael’s
relationship with Victoria is strong enough to give him a constitutional right to try to convince a
trial judge that Victoria’s best interest would be served by granting him visitation rights. I am
satisfied, however, that the California statute, as applied in this case, gave him that opportunity.”).
130. Miller, supra note 35, at 443.
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with the Court’s previous fathers’ rights cases—something Justice Scalia’s
opinion never attempted to do.131 They have theorized that in order to
harmonize the five decisions, the test would look something like this:
“[F]atherhood is a function of the confluence of three factors: the man’s
biological relationship with the child, his legal or social relationship with the
child’s mother, and the extent of his social and psychological commitment to
the child.”132
Whatever its precise meaning, Michael H. not only marked the final case
in the fathers’ rights cases, it also marked the last time the Court would weigh
in on who qualifies as a parent under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus,
since 1989, the Court has provided no further guidance on this very
important question—a question that, as Part III details, has become
increasingly complicated. Additionally, the fathers’ rights cases, although
touching on the subject of parental identity, are not sufficiently analogous to
contemporary parenthood issues to provide much assistance in adjudicating
such claims. Thus, faced with rapidly evolving family structures and with little
assistance from the Supreme Court, the states have been forced to take the
lead in discerning how to define “parenthood.”
III.

STATE APPROACHES TO “PARENTHOOD”

Since the Supreme Court last spoke on the issue of constitutional
parenthood, the states have had to confront a number of societal shifts, all of
which have further complicated determinations of parental identity.133 These
societal changes include advances in assisted reproduction technology, the
legalization of same-sex marriage, and the increasingly informal and
transitory nature of adult relationships—all of which contribute to what
131. Id. at 438 (“Justice Scalia did not explain why he chose to interpret these four cases in
the restrictive scope of the ‘unitary family,’ nor why he chose to ignore the statements in these
cases regarding parental participation in the child’s life. In support of his narrow view, Justice
Scalia quoted from neither Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, nor Lehr . . . .”).
132. Hill, supra note 22, at 381 (footnotes omitted); see also David W. Meyer, Family Diversity
and the Rights of Parenthood, in WHAT IS PARENTHOOD: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE
FAMILY, supra note 38, at 124, 130–31 (“The unwed father cases make clear that biology is
relevant, as is past caregiving, diligence, and the nature of the mother’s relationships with the
biological father and, if she is married, her husband. However, no single criterion controls the
constitutional definition of parenthood.” (footnote omitted)).
133. Mary Ann Glendon, Foreword to RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 45, at xiii, xiii (“The
late twentieth century was a time of unprecedented changes in family behavior, family law, and
ideas about marriage and family life.”); Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family
Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 629, 690 (2014) (“As marriage lost its grip on family law in the twentieth
century, and as blood and DNA testing began to make genetic parenthood easier to demonstrate,
the importance of marital, genetic, functional, and intentional parenthood shifted in family law,
providing broadened recognition of new types of parentage.”); Michael S. DePrince, Note, SameSex Marriage and Disestablishing Parentage: Reconceptualizing Legal Parenthood Through Surrogacy, 100
MINN. L. REV. 797, 806 (2015). (“[A] new understanding of legal parentage has evolved
alongside this starkly changing family landscape.”).
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Justice Stevens has described as “[t]he almost infinite variety of family
relationships that pervade our ever-changing society.”134 As state courts have
ventured into these new areas, they have developed a number of approaches
to help define 21st-century parenthood. This Part surveys a number of those
approaches in an attempt to do two things. First, by noting the degree to
which the states are taking disparate approaches to defining parenthood, this
Part underscores the need for more guidance on this issue from the Supreme
Court. Second, assuming that the Court accepts that invitation, a survey of
state innovations in this area will better inform the Court as it considers how
best to approach a more contemporary definition of parental identity.
A. ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
In 2007, a Maryland state court declared: “What had not been fathomed
exists today.”135 With advances in reproductive technology (“ART”),
individuals desiring biological children have a number of options to assist in
that endeavor. As Anthony Miller explains, “[c]hildren can be conceived in
the time honored way of sexual intercourse, through the relatively old
technology of artificial insemination, the relatively new technology of in vitro
fertilization, and perhaps eventually through the cutting edge technology of
cloning.”136 Each of these options, however, bring with them questions of
parenthood. After all, the more people who contribute to the conception of
a child, the greater the difficulty in assigning parental identity. The two
primary areas of ART which have posed the most difficulties in this regard are
artificial insemination, which raises questions about legal fatherhood, and
gestational surrogacy, which raises the previously unheard of question of legal
motherhood.
1. Artificial Insemination
Artificial insemination raises the question of the identity of the legal
father. Artificial insemination is a process through which a child is conceived
not through sexual intercourse, but through the injection of sperm into the
intended mother’s cervix.137 The man who donates the sperm would, of
course, be the biological father of the resulting child, but the question
remains as to who—if anyone—is the child’s legal father. As detailed below,
the states typically bestow that status on the man who is married to the

134. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 90 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Adoptions
of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 1993) (“It is the advancement of reproductive
technologies and society’s recognition of alternative lifestyles that have produced families in
which a biological, and therefore a legal, connection is no longer the sole organizing principle.”).
135. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 122 (Md. 2007).
136. Miller, supra note 35, at 451.
137. Browne C. Lewis, Dead Men Reproducing: Responding to the Existence of Afterdeath Children,
16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 403, 410 (2009).
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artificially inseminated woman.138 If the woman is unmarried, then the child
is treated as having no legal father—one of the few times the law regards a
child as having being born with only one legal parent.139 Complications arise,
however, because there are some circumstances in which a sperm donor can
be declared the legal father. Surveying these varying approaches is instructive
of how the law has come to view fatherhood and provides a potential rubric
for how the Supreme Court can approach the more salient question of who is
a parent.
i.

Sperm Donor as Father

If states were to equate biological and legal parenthood, determining the
legal father of a child conceived via artificial insemination would be simple—
it would be the sperm donor. That is not, however, the approach the states
generally take. Consider, for instance, the relevant California statute, which is
prototypical of most states: “The donor of semen provided to a licensed
physician and surgeon or to a licensed sperm bank for use in assisted
reproduction by a woman other than the donor’s spouse is treated in law as if
he were not the natural parent of a child thereby conceived . . . .”140 Thus,
sperm donors are typically denied all parental rights and obligations.141 Doing
so serves two important objectives. First, it encourages men to donate sperm
without fear that they will be required to support the resulting child.142

138. See infra Part III.A.1.i.
139. Ralph C. Brashier, Inheritance and Succession, Sociology of, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
& SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 759, 762 (David S. Clark ed., 2007) (“[T]he
woman is the sole legal parent of the child.”); Anne Reichman Schiff, Frustrated Intentions and
Binding Biology: Seeking AID in the Law, 44 DUKE L.J. 524, 536 (1994) (“Some UPA-based statutes
sever the legal relationship between the donor and the child not only when the woman is married,
but also when she is single. In these jurisdictions, a child born through AID has no legal father.”
(footnote omitted)).
140. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b)(1) (West 2017) (emphasis added). See generally Christina M.
Eastman, Comment, Statutory Regulation of Legal Parentage in Cases of Artificial Insemination by Donor:
A New Frontier of Gender Discrimination, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 371 (2010) (surveying the various
state laws on artificial insemination).
141. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 555 (2011) (“An oocyte donor shall have no right,
obligation or interest with respect to a child born as a result of a heterologous oocyte donation
from such donor. A child born as a result of a heterologous oocyte donation shall have no right,
obligation or interest with respect to the person who donated the oocyte which resulted in the
birth of the child.”); WIS. STAT. § 891.40(2) (West 2016) (“The donor of semen provided to a
licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor’s wife is not
the natural father of a child conceived, bears no liability for the support of the child and has no
parental rights with regard to the child.”).
142. See Ex rel. R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 32 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (noting that such laws “provide[]
‘men with a statutory vehicle for donating semen to married and unmarried women alike without
fear of liability for child support’” (quoting Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (Ct.
App. 1986))).
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Second, those who conceive using sperm from a third-party donor can do so
without worrying that the donor could make future claims on the child.143
Nonetheless, states permit parties to deviate from this general approach
and instead grant the sperm donor parental rights and responsibilities. To do
so, however, all involved must affirmatively consent to this arrangement. New
Jersey law, for example, provides: “Unless the donor of semen and the woman
have entered into a written contract to the contrary, the donor . . . shall have
no rights or duties stemming from the conception of a child.”144 Other states,
even in the absence of a statutory exception, have extended parental rights to
sperm donors when the parties’ conduct evinces an intent that the donor
serve as the child’s father. For example, in the Colorado case of Ex rel. R.C.,
the mother, E.C., asked her friend, J.R., to serve as her sperm donor.145 He
agreed, and E.C. (who was unmarried) successfully used his sperm to give
birth to a child.146 Following the birth, the mother eventually refused to allow
the donor to see the child, prompting him to bring a paternity action.147 In
his action, the donor claimed that he and the mother had orally agreed that
if he provided the sperm then, in exchange, he “would be treated as the father
of any child conceived by the artificial insemination.”148 Despite a Colorado
statute which stated that “[t]he donor of semen provided to a licensed
physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor’s
wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby
conceived,”149 the Supreme Court of Colorado refused to apply it in this
situation.150 In so ruling, that court first noted that the parental rights of a
semen donor are “least clearly understood when the semen donor is known
and the recipient is unmarried.”151 The court then held that the statute was
inapplicable when the man who donated sperm to an unmarried woman did
so with the understanding that he would be the father of the resulting child.152
The court also noted that the parties’ intent is “a relevant consideration in
143. See Browne Lewis, Two Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Paternal Obligations Between the Men
Involved in the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 949, 975 (2009); see also Ex
rel. R.C., 775 P.2d at 33 (“[W]omen are not likely to use donated semen from an anonymous
source if they can later be forced to defend a custody suit and possibly share parental rights and
duties with a stranger.”).
144. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West 2013).
145. Ex rel. R.C., 775 P.2d at 28. E.C. claimed, however, that it was J.R.’s idea to donate sperm.
Id. at 28 n.1.
146. Id. at 28.
147. Id. (“J.R. claims that E.C. said that she would not let him see R.C. again unless he signed
a release of his parental rights. He refused to sign the release.”).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 30 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106(2) (Supp. 1988)).
150. Id. at 35.
151. Id. at 33–34.
152. Id. at 35 (“[T]he General Assembly neither considered nor intended to affect the rights
of known donors who gave their semen to unmarried women for use in artificial insemination
with the agreement that the donor would be the father of any child so conceived.”).
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determining whether the known donor’s parental rights were
extinguished.”153 Other states have taken a similar approach, thus permitting
sperm donors to essentially contract for parental rights.154
Thus, as the law relates to the parentage of sperm donors, biology plays
little to no role in their ability to assume parental rights. Instead, it is the
intent of the parties that is dispositive. In other words, the fact that the sperm
donor is the biological father to the resulting child is irrelevant unless the two
biological parents agreed that the donor’s contribution would extend beyond
donating biological material to actually parenting the resulting child. Of
course, these rules apply to situations involving the artificial insemination of
unmarried women. As discussed in the next section, when the woman is married,
the calculus is quite different.
ii.

Husband of Artificially Inseminated Woman as Father

In a significant number of jurisdictions, if a married woman is artificially
inseminated with the sperm of a third party, her husband is considered the
child’s legal father despite the fact that the child is the biological child of
another man.155 However, the husband is afforded that status only if he
consents to the insemination.156 For example, a Tennessee statute that deals
with artificial insemination states that “[a] child born to a married woman as
a result of artificial insemination, with consent of the married woman’s
husband, is deemed to be the legitimate child of the husband and wife.”157 In
terms of what form his consent must take, however, states have adopted
different approaches. A few states require that the husband’s consent be in
writing.158 Most states, however, wishing to avoid situations in which a child is

153. Id. at 34.
154. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-703 (West 2006) (“A man who provides sperm for,
or consents to, assisted reproduction by a woman . . . with intent to be the parent of her child, is
a parent of the resulting child.”); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 244 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that denying sperm donor parental rights would “violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment if he can establish that he and respondent agreed that he should have
the rights and responsibilities of fatherhood and in reliance thereon he donated his semen”).
155. See Lewis, supra note 143, at 960–63.
156. Id.
157. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (West 2016); see also In re Marriage of Witbeck–Wildhagen,
667 N.E.2d 122, 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that, because respondent—the husband of
petitioner—did not provide “his consent to petitioner or any support to her choice to undergo
artificial insemination . . . it would be inconsistent with public policy to force upon respondent
parental obligations which he declined to undertake”).
158. Consider, for instance, the Minnesota statute, which provides that “the husband is
treated in law as if he were the biological father of a child thereby conceived [via artificial
insemination],” but, “[t]he husband’s consent must be in writing and signed by him and his wife.”
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (2012); see also Lewis, supra note 143, at 961 n.66 (listing other state
statutes that explicitly require written consent).
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born with only one legal parent, require very little to satisfy the consent
requirement.159
Some states presume consent of the husband. For example, in Maryland,
“[a] child conceived by artificial insemination of a married woman with the
consent of her husband is the legitimate child of both of them for all
purposes. Consent of the husband is presumed.”160 The husband may have,
however, a limited window of time in which he may avoid parental obligations
by offering proof that he never in fact consented.161 In states without any such
presumption, the courts are nonetheless quite liberal in extrapolating
consent from the surrounding circumstances. For instance, some states have
held that a husband’s consent to artificial insemination “may be express, or it
may be implied from conduct which evidences knowledge of the procedure
and failure to object.”162 Texas, for example, requires that the husband’s
consent be in writing, but also provides that the “[f]ailure by the husband to
sign a consent . . . before or after the birth of the child does not preclude a
finding that the husband is the father of a child born to his wife if the wife
and husband openly treated the child as their own.”163
Even in states without statutes directing courts to consider the parties’
conduct, courts tend to do so when disputes arise concerning a husband’s
consent to the artificial insemination of his wife. For example, in the New
Mexico case of Lane v. Lane, the husband and wife married in 1984; however,
prior to the marriage, the husband underwent a vasectomy.164 Thus, the wife
elected to conceive using artificial insemination.165 Although the husband
participated in the process,166 he never formally consented in writing.
Nonetheless, the husband played an active role in the child’s rearing, treating

159. Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach
to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 623–24 (2002) (“Public policy favoring legitimacy and support for
children creates a strong presumption that a husband consented to his wife’s insemination.”).
160. MD. CODE ANN., Est. & Trusts § 1-206(b) (West 2014); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-209(c)
(West 2015) (“Any child conceived following artificial insemination of a married woman with the
consent of her husband shall be treated as their child for all purposes of intestate succession. Consent
of the husband is presumed unless the contrary is shown by clear and convincing evidence.”).
161. For example, Delaware law provides that “the husband of a wife who gives birth to a
child by means of assisted reproduction” is not liable for child support if “(1) Within [two] years
after learning of the birth of the child he commences a proceeding to adjudicate his paternity;
and (2) [t]he court finds that he did not consent to the assisted reproduction, before or after
birth of the child.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-705(a) (West 2006). Other states follow a similar
approach. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-705(1) (2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-905(a) (2015).
162. In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877, 879 (S.C. 1987) (citing R.S. v. R.S., 670 P.2d 923 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1983)).
163. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.704(a) (2014).
164. Lane v. Lane, 912 P.2d 290, 292 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
165. Id.
166. Id. (“Husband participated in the process, driving Wife for some medical visits,
attending birthing classes, and being present in the delivery room . . . .”).
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the resulting daughter, Colleen, in all respects as his own child.167 The couple
eventually filed for divorce, and the wife sought sole custody of the child on
the grounds that the husband was not the child’s father given that he never
gave written consent to the insemination as required by state law.168 The court
rejected her argument, noting at the outset “that even though a statute
constitutes a command to the courts regarding what law to apply, the
command must be read with intelligence.”169 Furthermore, in looking at the
statute, the court observed that “[t]he statute does not require any particular
form of words for the consent.”170 With that in mind, the court held that the
husband had substantially complied with the statute given the degree to which
the parties had publicly held the child out as being the husband’s daughter:
“[M]ore than two and one-half years after the birth of Colleen, and even after
the marriage had failed, both Husband and Wife were acknowledging
Husband’s status as Colleen’s natural father.”171
Under the law of artificial insemination, then, a sperm donor can
become a legal father by virtue of his biological connection, but only if he and
the mother agreed in advance that he be afforded parental rights. In contrast,
a man who is married to the inseminated woman can become a legal father
despite the fact that he shares no biological relationship with the child so long
as he consented to the insemination, which can be shown through his intent
(i.e., express consent) or his conduct (i.e., implied consent). Thus, as the law
of artificial insemination demonstrates, the path to parenthood has very much
become situational, with different rules arising based on the particular
relationship of the parties as well as the factual context in which those
relationships arise.
2. Gestational Surrogacy
Just as artificial insemination raises questions of fatherhood, gestational
surrogacy poses similar questions about motherhood. As an initial point,
traditional surrogacy does not present such difficulties given that the
surrogate not only carries the child, but she is also the biological mother,

167. Id. (“Wife encouraged Husband to be an active parent, and he was.”).
168. Id. at 294.
169. Id. at 295 (“The legislature . . . cannot anticipate every contingency. . . . [But] can,
however, expect that when one of its orders . . . is to be carried out, those who have that duty . . .
will discern its purpose and act in accordance with its essence if not necessarily its letter.”).
170. Id. Further, the court held that
[g]iven the purposes of the statute, a writing should be satisfactory if it conveys in
some manner that (1) the husband knows of the conception by artificial
insemination, (2) the husband agrees to be treated as the lawful father of the child
so conceived, and (3) the wife agrees that the husband will be treated as the lawful
father of the child.
Id.
171.

Id. at 296.
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often having been artificially inseminated with the sperm of the intended
father.172 The expectation is that, after the child is born, the surrogate will
surrender her parental rights in favor of the individual or couple who hired
her.173 With gestational surrogacy, however, a surrogate agrees to carry a child
with which she shares no biological relationship given that she is implanted
with a fertilized egg, one that is often donated by a different woman
entirely.174 Thus, with gestational surrogacy “the roles of genetic contribution
and gestation can effectively be separated from each other and assumed by
different individuals”175—specifically, the surrogate herself, the egg donor,
and the woman who intends to raise the child.176 As a result, questions can
and do arise as to who is the child’s legal mother.
i.

Egg Donor as Mother

One way to answer that question would be simply to base the
determination of motherhood on biological parenthood, with preference
given to the egg donor. Courts in Ohio have done just that, holding “that the
individuals who provide the genes of that child are the natural parents,” and
unless they have waived their rights “then they must be recognized as the
natural and legal parents.”177 One of the justifications provided by the court
was that “given the relative certainty of DNA blood testing, such a foundation
or test for parental identity would be simpler to apply and more certain in
results.”178 In 2007, the Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed this position that,
when it comes to gestational surrogacy, the legal mother is the egg donor.
There, the court affirmed a lower court’s ruling that gestational surrogacy
contracts did not violate the state’s “public policy against private agreements
to forgo parental rights” given that the surrogate was not the biological

172. See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 130–31 (2006).
173. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1259 (N.J. 1988) (describing a traditional surrogacy
contract as one in which “a perfectly fit mother was expected to surrender her newly born
infant”); see also KINDGREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 172, at 131 (“[I]t is standard protocol for
the surrogate to agree to surrender any resulting child for adoption after its birth to make the
child available for adoption by the intended mother.”).
174. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 117 (Md. 2007) (“The gestational surrogacy context
can involve anonymous sperm and egg donors, with the result that the child has no genetic
relation to the gestational carrier or the intended parents.”); KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note
172, at 132–33.
175. Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the Conundrum
of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L. REV. 265, 265 (1995).
176. See Hendricks, supra note 15, at 431 (“Law has lagged behind, trying to decide which
mother (genetic mother, gestational mother, or intended mother) is the true mother.”).
177. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 767 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994).
178. Id. at 766–67.
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mother and thus “had no parental rights to contract away.”179 Instead,
according to the court, the child’s mother was the egg donor.180
ii.

Gestational Surrogate as Mother

A second approach is recognizing the gestational surrogate as the child’s
mother. In A.H.W. v. G.H.B., a 2000 case out of New Jersey, a married couple
entered into an agreement with a surrogate whereby embryos created from
the married couple’s genetic material were implanted in the surrogate.181
Thus, the resulting child would be the biological child of the married couple,
but would have gestated in the womb of the surrogate. The married couple
petitioned for a pre-birth order listing them as the parents of the resulting
child so that they could have their names listed on the birth certificate.182 The
Superior Court of New Jersey, however, refused. Relying on the Supreme
Court of New Jersey’s previous rulings on traditional surrogacy, the court held
that the gestational surrogate was the mother.183 Accordingly, pursuant to
state adoption law, she could not legally surrender her maternal rights prior
to the child’s birth.184
In so doing, the court acknowledged the difference between traditional
and gestational surrogacy—namely, unlike a gestational surrogate, a
traditional surrogate is also the biological mother.185 Nonetheless, the court
held that, because a gestational surrogate still manifests some aspects of
motherhood, her parental rights could not be terminated prior to birth:
A bond is created between a gestational mother and the baby she
carries in her womb for nine months. During the pregnancy, the
fetus relies on the gestational mother for a myriad of contributions.
A gestational mother’s endocrine system determines the timing,
amount and components of hormones that affect the fetus. The
absence of any component at its appropriate time will irreversibly

179. J.F. v. D.B., 848 N.E.2d 873, 878–79 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006), aff’d, 879 N.E.2d 740
(Ohio 2007).
180. Id. at 879 (“Flynn and Rice were the genetic providers, so Flynn and Rice were the
children’s parents under Ohio law.”).
181. A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 949 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 953. The Superior Court noted that “New Jersey regulations governing the
creation of birth records state that the woman who gives birth must be recorded as a parent on
the birth certificate.” Id. (citing N.J.A.C. 8:2–1.4(a) (2005)).
184. Id. at 954; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41(e) (West 2013) (“A surrender by the birth
parent of a child shall not be valid if taken within 72 hours of the birth of the child.”).
185. A.H.W., 772 A.2d at 953 (“While [the parties] are correct that [the surrogate] will have
no biological ties to the baby, their simplistic comparison to an incubator disregards the fact that
there are human emotions and biological changes involved in pregnancy.”).
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alter the life, mental capacity, appearance, susceptibility to disease
and structure of the fetus forever.186
In 2010, New Jersey would go one step further and hold that the infertile
woman who hires a gestational surrogate can only become the legal mother
through formal adoption, which can take place only after the child is born.187
In that case, a married couple hired a gestational surrogate who would carry
the child, which was conceived using the husband’s sperm and an egg from
an anonymous donor.188 Once again the procuring couple sought a pre-birth
order that would list them as the father and mother of the child.189 The court
refused, ruling the gestational surrogate’s “parental rights are deemed worthy
of protection and thus stand in the way of the infertile wife’s claim to
automatic motherhood.”190 Therefore, formal adoption was required to
transfer parental rights from the gestational surrogate to the intended
mother.191
iii.

Intended Mother as Mother

The third and final approach to determining parental rights in cases
involving gestational surrogacy takes a more flexible approach, focusing not
on biology, but on intent. Under the intent test, the state determines which
woman, prior to the child’s conception, affirmatively intended to serve as the
child’s mother—that woman is then considered the child’s legal mother.192
The seminal case in this area is the 1993 California case of Johnson v. Calvert.193
There, Mark and Crispina Calvert wished to have a child, but Crispina, due to
an earlier hysterectomy, was unable to become pregnant.194 Nonetheless,
because Crispina’s ovaries remained capable of producing eggs, she and Mark
were able to produce an embryo using in vitro fertilization.195 The couple then
entered into an agreement with Anna Johnson, who agreed to serve as a

186. Id. “The gestational mother contributes an endocrine cascade that determines how the
child will grow, when its cells will divide and differentiate in the womb, and how the child will
appear and function for the rest of its life.” Id.
187. In re Parentage of a Child by T.J.S. & A.L.S., 16 A.3d 386, 388 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).
188. Id. at 388–89.
189. Id. at 389.
190. Id. at 396.
191. Id. at 391 (“[C]ontrary to the gender-neutral interpretation plaintiffs ask us to adopt,
the plain language of the Act provides for a declaration of maternity only to a biologically—or
gestationally—related female and requires adoption to render A.L.S. the mother of T.D.S.”).
192. Mary Patricia Byrn & Lisa Giddings, An Empirical Analysis of the Use of the Intent Test to
Determine Parentage in Assisted Reproductive Technology Cases, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1295, 1296 (2013)
(explaining that under the intent test, “when a child is conceived via ART, the person(s) that
intended to bring the child into the world and raise the child should be the child’s legal parent(s)”).
193. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
194. Id. at 778.
195. Id. at 782.
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gestational surrogate.196 Not long after Anna became pregnant with the
Calvert’s child, however, “relations deteriorated” between the couple and
Anna, prompting both sides to file competing lawsuits seeking a declaration
of motherhood.197 Anna claimed that she was the legal mother given that she
was the gestational mother, whereas Crispina claimed motherhood through
her genetic relationship to the child.198
The court began by noting that “California law recognizes only one
natural mother, despite advances in reproductive technology rendering a
different outcome biologically possible.”199 Beyond that, however, the court
could discern “no clear legislative preference” between biological
motherhood and gestational motherhood given that California recognized
both as “means of establishing a mother and child relationship.”200 Thus, for
situations in which the biological mother (in this case, Crispina) is someone
other than the person who gestated the child (i.e., Anne), the court needed
a means of deciding between the two presumptions. The court settled on
intent, and specifically found that, “she who intended to procreate the child—
that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended
to raise as her own—is the natural mother under California law.”201 Applying
that standard to the facts, the Calverts emerged as the legal parents:
Mark and Crispina are a couple who desired to have a child of their
own genetic stock but are physically unable to do so without the help
of reproductive technology. They affirmatively intended the birth of
the child, and took the steps necessary to effect in vitro fertilization.
But for their acted-on intention, the child would not exist.202
Although Anna tried to rely on the fathers’ rights cases discussed
earlier203 to bolster her claim to parenthood, the California court rejected
those arguments, noting that they depend on a prior determination that Anna
is in fact the child’s mother: “Since Crispina is the child’s mother under
California law because she, not Anna, provided the ovum for the in vitro
196. Id. at 778 (“Mark, Crispina, and Anna signed a contract providing that an embryo
created by the sperm of Mark and the egg of Crispina would be implanted in Anna and the child
born would be taken into Mark and Crispina’s home ‘as their child.’”).
197. Id.
198. See id. at 778, 781 (“[W]e are left with the undisputed evidence that Anna, not Crispina,
gave birth to the child and that Crispina, not Anna, is genetically related to him. Both women
thus have adduced evidence of a mother and child relationship as contemplated by the Act.”).
199. Id. at 781. Although some amici had advocated that both women should be recognized
as the child’s mother, the court declined this invitation: “To recognize parental rights in a third
party with whom the Calvert family has had little contact since shortly after the child’s birth would
diminish Crispina’s role as mother.” Id. at 781 n.8.
200. Id. at 781–82.
201. Id. at 782.
202. Id. (“The parties’ aim was to bring Mark’s and Crispina’s child into the world, not for Mark
and Crispina to donate a zygote to Anna. Crispina from the outset intended to be the child’s mother.”).
203. See supra Part II.
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fertilization procedure, intending to raise the child as her own, it follows that
any constitutional interests Anna possesses in this situation are something less
than those of a mother.”204
Subsequently, California would extend the intent test to cover an
intended mother who did not even have a biological relationship with the
child in question. In In re Marriage of Buzzanca, a married couple, John and
Luanne Buzzanca, contracted with a surrogate to carry an embryo that was
produced using both sperm and an egg from anonymous donors.205 Despite
the fact that the wife in that case, unlike in Calvert, could not claim a biological
connection to the child, the court nonetheless had little difficulty in
adjudicating her to be the legal mother in light of her intent: “Even though
neither Luanne nor John are biologically related to [the resulting child], they
are still her lawful parents given their initiating role as the intended parents
in her conception and birth.”206 Other courts have adopted similar intent
standards for resolving questions of motherhood.207 At least one state has even
enacted a statute that requires courts to take intent into consideration.
Arkansas, for example, provides that a child born as a result of artificial
insemination “shall be, for all legal purposes, the child of the woman giving
birth, except in the case of a surrogate mother, in which event the child shall
be that of . . . [t]he biological father and the woman intended to be the
mother.”208
In sum, the emergence of gestational surrogacy has challenged the
longstanding assumption that the woman who gives birth to a child must also
be that child’s legal mother. Instead, the law of gestational surrogacy, just like
the law of artificial insemination, reveals that parenthood—be it motherhood
or fatherhood—can no longer be based exclusively on biology. Instead, to
204. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 786. At the same time, the court did recognize the essential role
that Anna played:
Although the gestative function Anna performed was necessary to bring about the
child’s birth, it is safe to say that Anna would not have been given the opportunity to
gestate or deliver the child had she, prior to implantation of the zygote, manifested
her own intent to be the child’s mother.
Id. at 782.
205. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
206. Id. at 293.
207. See, e.g., Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 793 (Conn. 2011) (allowing “an intended
parent who is a party to a valid gestational agreement to become a parent without first adopting
the children, without respect to that intended parent’s genetic relationship to the children”).
Relatedly, some courts have determined motherhood in cases involving gestational surrogacy by
simply enforcing the terms of the surrogacy agreement. See, e.g., In re Paternity & Custody of Baby
Boy A., No. A07-452, 2007 WL 4304448, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007) (denying
gestational surrogate’s petition to be declared the child’s legal mother in light of the surrogacy
agreement in which she averred that she had “no intention of having physical or legal custody or
any parental rights, duties or obligations with respect to any child born of this gestational
surrogacy process”).
208. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(c)(1) (2015).
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determine legal parentage, states are now actively looking at intent, asking
who intended to parent the resulting child to determine legal parentage. As
the next section demonstrates, however, some states treat parentage
determinations for children born via assisted reproduction somewhat
differently when the intended parents are the same sex.
B. SAME-SEX PARENTAGE
A similarly complicated question of parentage exists in cases of biological
children being raised by same-sex couples. As Justice Kennedy noted in his
majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, “hundreds of thousands of children
are presently being raised by [same-sex] couples”—couples who “provide
loving and nurturing homes to their children, whether biological or
adopted.”209 Of course, for children who are jointly adopted by same-sex
couples, parenthood determinations present little difficulty. For biological
children being raised in same-sex families, however, the questions become
more difficult. After all, two people of the same sex cannot currently conceive
a child using only their genetic material.210 Thus, any biological child in a
same-sex relationship will, at most, be the biological child of only one of the
adults in that family. For that person’s spouse or partner—that is, the person
who lacks a biological relationship with the child—states have had to grapple
with the question of that individual’s parental rights. As a result, a number of
state cases concerning same-sex couples have emerged, offering various
insights into how the law treats parentage determinations of adults in samesex families who lack biological connections with their children.211

209. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
210. See John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 323, 324–25 (2004) (“Homosexuals may also seek ARTs for infertility, but more
often they use them because they cannot reproduce with their partners or others of the same
sex.”). As advances in assisted reproduction continue, however, even this may change. Indeed, as
Professor Michael Boucai has noted,
in vitro gameteogenesis (IVG) [is] a process successfully tested in mice, whereby a
sperm cell is created from an egg cell—or, alternatively, an egg cell is created from
a sperm cell. IVG could allow same-sex couples to have offspring biologically related
to both partners and, by eliminating the need for third-party gametes, enable them
“to reproduce in a manner similar to fertile straight couples.”
Michael Boucai, Is Assisted Procreation an LGBT Right?, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1065, 1093 (quoting
Sonia M. Suter, In Vitro Gametogenesis: Just Another Way to Have a Baby?, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 87,
103 (2016)).
211. Currently, all such cases have involved lesbian couples, which is not surprising given the
relative ease with which two women can conceive a child using assisted reproduction. See NeJaime,
supra note 14, at 1200 (“With the rise of alternative insemination in the late 1970s and 1980s,
the number of lesbian couples starting families skyrocketed.”). Same-sex male couples, on the
other hand, who desire children with a biological connection to one of the fathers would have to
use some version of surrogacy, which is exponentially more expensive, more complicated, and
thus more unusual. See Robertson, supra note 210, at 350 (“[A] surrogate mother is essential for
gay male reproduction to occur . . . .”).
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For those same-sex couples who are married, one option is to simply
apply the marital presumption, which as discussed earlier, provides that the
husband of a woman who has been artificially inseminated is, unless he did
not consent, deemed the legal father.212 Disaggregating the presumption
from its gendered language would lead to the same result for the female
spouse of a woman who, while married, conceived a child via artificial
insemination. Indeed, that is exactly what at least two courts have done.213 For
example, in Gartner v. Iowa Department of Public Health, a 2013 decision by the
Iowa Supreme Court,214 Melissa and Heather Gartner married just a few
months after Iowa legalized same-sex marriage.215 Heather became pregnant
using artificial insemination, but the state Department of Health refused to
list Melissa’s name on the birth certificate given that she had not formally
adopted the child.216 Iowa’s marital presumption provides that “[i]f the
mother was married at the time of conception, birth, or at any time during
the period between conception and birth, the name of the husband shall be
entered on the certificate.”217 The Department, however, believed this statute
to be inapplicable, noting that “[t]he system for registration of births in Iowa
currently recognizes the biological and ‘gendered’ roles of ‘mother’ and
‘father,’ grounded in the biological fact that a child has one biological mother
and one biological father.”218
The Supreme Court of Iowa rejected the Department’s interpretation,
ruling that an interpretation that applies the marital presumption to oppositesex but not same-sex couples would violate the equal protection guarantee of
the Iowa Constitution.219 First, the court found that both same-sex and
opposite-sex couples were similarly situated in this regard: “The Gartners are
in a legally recognized marriage, just like opposite-sex couples. The official
recognition of their child as part of their family provides a basis for identifying
and verifying the birth of their child, just as it does for opposite-sex
couples.”220 Thus, according to the court, to treat same-sex couples differently
was to discriminate on the basis of either sex or sexual orientation, either of
which would incur intermediate scrutiny.221 The court went on to hold that
the state had failed to prove that its gendered interpretation of the marital
212. See supra Part III.A.1.
213. See infra note 223.
214. Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 340 (Iowa 2013).
215. Id. at 341.
216. Id. (“The certificate only listed Heather as Mackenzie’s parent. The space for the second
parent’s name was blank.”).
217. Id. at 344 (quoting IOWA CODE § 144.13(2) (2011)).
218. Id. at 342.
219. Id. at 354. The court noted that, “[u]nder the Iowa Constitution, ‘the equal protection
guarantee requires that laws treat all those who are similarly situated with respect to the purposes of
the law alike.’” Id. at 351 (quoting Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009)).
220. Id. at 351.
221. Id. at 351–52.
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presumption was substantially related to any important governmental
objective, holding that “[i]t is important for our laws to recognize that
married lesbian couples who have children enjoy the same benefits and
burdens as married opposite-sex couples who have children.”222 In ruling as it
did, the court also noted that “the only explanation for not listing the
nonbirthing lesbian spouse on the birth certificate is stereotype or
prejudice.”223
Other states, however, have strictly adhered to the gendered terms of the
marital presumption.224 In 2016, for example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas
upheld “the Arkansas Department of Health’s (ADH) refusal to issue birth
certificates for minor children of married female couples showing the name
of the spouse of the mother.”225 In ruling, the court analyzed the statute in
question, which provides that “if the mother was married at the time of either
conception or birth or between conception and birth the name of the
husband shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the child.”226 As
an initial matter, the court found that “[t]he purpose of the statutes is to
truthfully record the nexus of the biological mother and the biological father
to the child.”227 Accordingly, the court ruled that it must “construe it just as it
reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in
common language.”228 The court then turned to Webster’s dictionary, noting
“that ‘husband’ is defined as ‘a married man.’”229 In ruling as it did, the court
rejected the same-sex couples’ equal protection challenge, merely noting that
“the female spouse of a biological mother . . . does not have the same
biological nexus to the child that the biological mother or the biological

222. Id. at 353. Specifically, in terms of birth certificates, “married lesbian couples require
accurate records of their child’s birth, as do their opposite-sex counterparts. The distinction for
this purpose between married opposite-sex couples and married lesbian couples does not exist
and cannot defeat an equal protection analysis.” Id. at 351.
223. Id. at 353. The Supreme Court of Arizona recently reached a similar result, holding that
the state’s marital presumption, which “by its terms only applies to males,” must likewise protect
the parental rights of a lesbian spouse. McLaughlin v. Jones, 401 P.3d 492, 496 (Ariz. 2017)
(“[I]n the wake of Obergefell, excluding [wife of woman who bore a child via artificial
insemination] from the marital paternity presumption violates the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
224. In addition to the Arkansas case, discussed infra, Florida has likewise taken a similar
approach to restricting the right of lesbian couples to rely on the marital presumption. See
NeJaime, supra note 14, at 1243–44 (“A Florida statute provides that, ‘[i]f the mother is married
at the time of birth, the name of the husband shall be entered on the birth certificate as the father
of the child,’ but the state has refused to apply this statutory provision to married lesbian couples.”
(footnote omitted) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 382.013(2)(a) (2015))).
225. Smith v. Pavan, 505 S.W.3d 169, 172 (Ark. 2016), rev’d sub nom. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S.
Ct. 2075 (2017).
226. Id. at 175 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(f)(1) (2012)).
227. Id. at 180.
228. Id. at 177.
229. Id. at 177–78 (quoting Husband, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(2002)).
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father has.”230 Thus, concluded the court: “It does not violate equal protection
to acknowledge basic biological truths.”231
Beyond the parental rights arising from same-sex marriage, states have
also had to decide the parental status of unmarried individuals vis-à-vis the
biological children of their same-sex partners. In Elisa B. v. Superior Court, for
instance, the Supreme Court of California ruled that the former partner of a
woman who had conceived twins via artificial insemination was the legal
parent of those children.232 The court arrived at this conclusion despite the
fact that the woman in question, Elisa B., had no biological relationship to the
children, and the two women were never married.233 The court based its
decision on a California statute that declared “a man is presumed to be the
natural father of a child if ‘[h]e receives the child into his home and openly
holds out the child as his natural child.’”234 Despite the statute’s use of
gendered language, state law also provided that, when attempting to establish
a mother-child relationship, “the provisions of this part applicable to the
father and child relationship apply.”235 In light of that statutory directive, and
given the active role Elisa had played in the twins’ early life, the court had
little difficulty in finding that Elisa was a legal parent:
Elisa is a presumed mother of the twins . . . because she received the
children into her home and openly held them out as her natural
children, and that this is not an appropriate action in which to rebut
the presumption that Elisa is the twins’ parent with proof that she is
not the children’s biological mother because she actively
participated in causing the children to be conceived with the
understanding that she would raise the children as her own together
with the birth mother, she voluntarily accepted the rights and
obligations of parenthood after the children were born, and there

230. Id. at 181. In support, the court quoted from the Supreme Court’s decision in Tuan Anh
Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001): “[T]o fail to acknowledge even our most basic biological
differences . . . risks making the guarantee of equal protection superficial, and so disserving it.” Id.
231. Id. The same-sex couples subsequently appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which took
the rare step of issuing a summary reversal. In ruling, however, the Court said nothing about
constitutional parenthood or even substantive due process, but instead seemed to rely on an
equal protection argument, limiting its holding to the narrow ground that, by making the marital
presumption available to married opposite-sex couples, Arkansas could not withhold that same
benefit from married same-sex couples: “The State uses [the marital presumption] to give married
parents a form of legal recognition that is not available to unmarried parents. Having made that
choice, Arkansas may not, consistent with Obergefell, deny married same-sex couples that
recognition.” Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078–79 (2017).
232. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005).
233. Id. at 663.
234. Id. at 667 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (Deering 2005)). California subsequently
amended the statute to make it gender neutral. See A.B. 1403, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
235. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 665 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650 (Deering 2005)).
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are no competing claims to her being the children’s second
parent.236
Thus, the court held that Elisa was a legal parent not because she was
biologically related to the child or even that she was married to the mother,
but instead because she was the intended parent of the twins and, in addition,
had affirmatively acted as a parent.
In other states, however, courts have refused to recognize same-sex
partners as legal parents even when faced with overwhelming evidence of that
person’s intent to serve in that role. For instance, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin remanded a case with facts similar to that of Elisa B. to determine
the parental rights of the same-sex partner.237 Even then, the court made clear
that, at most, the partner would have to prove that “she has a parent-like
relationship with the child and that a significant triggering event justifies state
intervention in the child’s relationship with a biological or
adoptive parent.”238 In other words, the court seemed to assume that a samesex partner in her position had no claim to legal parenthood but perhaps
could qualify under some secondary status.
Thus, some states have seized upon the lack of standards relating to
constitutional parenthood to openly discriminate against the same-sex
parents of children conceived using artificial inseminations.239 Courts in these
states refuse to apply state marital presumptions to same-sex spouses and
refuse to consider findings of parental intent. Indeed, of all the recent
changes to the American family, it appears that the legalization of the samesex marriage has prompted overt forms of discrimination when it comes to
how the states have defined “parent.”240 One of the biggest contributors to the
states’ ability to discriminate in this manner is the lack of any guidance from
the Supreme Court on the constitutional limits relating to parental identity.
C. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENT
As the previous sections illustrate, when it comes to assisted reproduction
and same-sex families, parental identity turns heavily on who, prior to the
child’s conception, intended to parent the child.241 The realities of family and
child-rearing, however, are such that regardless of who was initially the

236. Id. at 670.
237. See In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421–22, 425–30 (Wis. 1995).
238. Id. at 421 (emphasis added).
239. See NeJaime, supra note 14, at 1245 (“In states that remain hostile to LGBT equality,
resistance to application of the marital presumption to same-sex couples surely represents further
enactment of anti-LGBT sentiment.”); supra note 222 and accompanying text.
240. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Geography of Equal Protection, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1579, 1614
(2017) (“The family law regimes of many states are infused with anti-gay prejudice. . . . Although
Obergefell has extended the constitutional right to marry to include same-sex couples, many states
continue to discriminate against gay families.”).
241. See supra Part III.A.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009947

A3_HIGDON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

CONSTITUTIONAL PARENTHOOD

4/23/2018 5:43 PM

1519

intended parent(s), the actual individual(s) who function as the child’s
parent(s) can change over that child’s life—a phenomenon one scholar refers
to as “Mid-Life Parental Switches.”242 This is especially true today given that
divorce is not only more common than it was earlier in our nation’s history,
but there are also increased patterns of “divorce, cohabitation, and
remarriage,”243 all of which give rise to novel questions of parenthood. As
Nancy Dowd has described, “[m]ultiple parents . . . are a social reality[,] but
not a legal category.”244 Thus, courts have been increasingly called upon to
decide whether someone can become a parent simply by functioning as one.
In attempting to label this form of parentage, courts have used a variety of
terms including psychological parent, quasi-parent, and parent by estoppel.245
Initially, it is important to note that courts have largely resisted such
claims. Consider, for instance, the case of Donald Merkel, who lived with his
girlfriend and her son for seven years.246 Merkel, despite being neither the
legal nor the biological father, had nonetheless assumed responsibility for
helping raise the child.247 Thus, when the relationship between the two adults
ended, Merkel filed for visitation, claiming that he was a de facto parent.248
The lower court, however, dismissed his petition, and the Supreme Court of
South Dakota affirmed. In ruling, the court stated that “[b]efore a parent’s
right to custody over his or her own children will be disturbed in favor of a
nonparent a clear showing against the parent of ‘gross misconduct or
unfitness, or of other extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of the
child’ is required.”249 Given that Merkel failed to make any such showing, his
petition was dismissed.250 In holding as it did, the court made clear that “an
award cannot be made to [nonparents] simply because they may be better

242. Buss, supra note 45, at 676 (“In these cases, a child classically lives with one or both
biological parents for some period of her life, but at some point, others assume much or all of
the parents’ child rearing responsibilities.”).
243. McClain, supra note 38, at 55; see also NeJaime, supra note 14, at 1196 (“With more
divorces came more second marriages. As divorced parents formed blended families—and other
unmarried women with children married—stepparents assumed parental roles.”); Linda C.
McClain & Daniel Cere, Introduction, in WHAT IS PARENTHOOD: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT
THE FAMILY, supra note 38, at 1 (“[D]emographic reports suggest[] a shift away from marriage
and toward alternative family forms . . . .”).
244. Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 231, 231 (2007).
245. See, e.g., LP v. LF, 338 P.3d 908, 909, 920–21 (Wyo. 2014) (using “parentage by
estoppel”); H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d 206, 211 (N.Y. 2010) (using “quasi-parents”); V.C. v. M.J.B.,
748 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 2000) (using the term “psychological parent” throughout the opinion).
246. Cooper v. Merkel, 470 N.W.2d 253, 254 (S.D. 1991).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 255 (quoting Langerman v. Langerman, 336 N.W.2d 669, 670 (S.D. 1983)).
250. Id. at 256 (“Donald’s motion for visitation contained no charge that Tamera was unfit
or guilty of misconduct nor was there any allegation of unusual circumstances. The motion
merely alleged that Donald helped raise Tamera’s son and that having assumed part of that
responsibility he should be granted the opportunity to visit the boy.”).
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custodians.”251 South Dakota is by no means an anomaly in this regard.252 As
Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson points out, “[v]ery few [jurisdictions] permit
unmarried cohabitants to initiate actions for custody or visitation.”253
Even in cases involving married couples, stepparents have likewise
encountered resistance when trying to gain parental rights over the children
they helped raise. For example, Nicholas Gansner and Miki Mancine married
a few months after Mancine’s adoption of her son, William, became final.254
At this time, William was not quite one year old, and Mancine had adopted
him as a single parent.255 Despite his intention to adopt William, Gansner
never did so.256 Nonetheless, he held himself out as William’s father and,
according to his testimony, served as the child’s primary caregiver.257 In 2010,
Mancine filed for divorce, prompting Gansner to move for sole custody of
William.258 In response, Mancine successfully moved to dismiss his petition
given that he was not the child’s legal parent.259 Gansner appealed, claiming
“that he acted as William’s father in every way and has developed a bond with
William such that he should be recognized as William’s ‘equitable parent.’”260
The Illinois appellate court, however, rejected his argument, noting that the
state had not recognized equitable parentage and that Gansner, despite
knowing “at all times that he would have to formally adopt William in order
to be his legal parent,” failed to do so.261
Although the minority approach, some jurisdictions have been more
sympathetic to such claims. In fact, as David Meyer describes, “[a] growing
number of courts and legislatures now permit adults who assumed the
functional role of a parent to preserve their relationship with a child” despite
objections from the child’s legal parent.262 Colorado did just that in 2004
when it awarded parental rights to a party who not only lacked a legal
relationship with the child in question but who was not even married to the
251. Id. at 255.
252. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ephraim H. v. Jon P., No. A–04–1488, 2005 WL 2347727, at *3
(Neb. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2005) (awarding custody to biological father and not step-father despite
the fact that biological father had been “mostly absent from” the child’s life).
253. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Undeserved Trust: Reflections on the ALI’s Treatment of De Facto
Parents, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 45, at 90, 98 (footnote omitted).
254. In re Marriage of Mancine and Gansner, 9 N.E.3d 550, 555 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
255. Id. (“Because Miki had already started the adoption process of William as a single parent
before she met Nicholas, Miki and Nicholas were advised by the adoption agent to finish the
process of Miki’s adoption of William, and then for Nicholas to adopt William as a stepparent
after the parties’ marriage.”).
256. Id. at 554.
257. Id. at 556.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 565.
261. Id. at 568.
262. Meyer, supra note 45, at 50.
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parent of the child.263 Cheryl Ann Clark and Elsey Maxwell McLeod were in a
committed relationship for eleven years.264 Although the two never married,
they did discuss having children together.265 Eventually, they settled on
adoption, with Clark adopting a child from China.266 Because China would
not permit adoption by same-sex couples, the adoption was by Clark only.267
Nonetheless, the two traveled to China together to bring the child home and
subsequently represented themselves publicly as the child’s two parents.268 Six
years after the adoption, the relationship between Clark and McLeod ended,
and Clark attempted to limit McLeod’s visitation with the child.269 McLeod,
in turn, petitioned for equal parenting time.270 The Colorado court held that
McLeod, despite being neither a natural nor adoptive parent, was nonetheless
a psychological parent, which the state defined as “someone other than a
biological parent who develops a parent-child relationship with a child
through day-to-day interaction, companionship, and caring for the child.”271
In light of that recognition, and concerned with the harm that would befall
the child should McLeod’s parental rights be terminated, the court granted
McLeod’s petition, awarding her joint parental responsibilities over the
child.272
Similarly, in 2004, New Jersey held that a neighbor who had, with the
consent of the child’s legal custodian, been “involved in every aspect of [the
child’s] life from four months old to four and one-half years old,” was a
psychological parent and, as such, had standing to petition for custody.273 Just
like the court in Colorado, the court was primarily motivated by the harm that
would befall the child should the relationship be terminated: “[A]t the heart
of the psychological parent cases is a recognition that children have a strong
interest in maintaining the ties that connect them to adults who love and

263. In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 562 (Colo. App. 2004).
264. Id. at 549.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. For example, the adoption announcement stated: “[E.L.M.C.] was born in the
Hunan providence of the People’s Republic of China. She lived the first six months of her life in
the Yue Yang Children’s Welfare Home in Yue Yang, China. She now lives with two adoring
moms.” Id.
269. Id. at 550.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 562, 559 (quoting In re Marriage of Martin, 42 P.3d 75, 77–78 (Colo. App. 2002)).
272. Id. at 562 (“Accordingly, we conclude that, in light of the overwhelming evidence
showing McLeod had become a psychological parent, whom E.L.M.C. recognized almost from
birth, the curtailment and later termination of McLeod’s parental responsibilities in Clark’s
proposed parenting plan threatened emotional harm to E.L.M.C. . . . .”).
273. P.B. v. T.H., 851 A.2d 780, 790 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
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provide for them.”274 It is important to note, however, that in these cases, the
courts used psychological parenthood merely as a means for awarding
parental rights, without necessarily ruling that these individuals have attained
the status of legal parenthood.275
Some have suggested, however, that perhaps psychological parentage
should instead be viewed as an additional path to legal parenthood. The
American Law Institute (“ALI”) adopted this approach in its Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution (“Principles”).276 Published in 2002, the purpose of
the Principles was to propose “how the law should respond to changes in
family forms over the last half century.”277 Specifically, the Principles attempt
to answer the question “Who is a parent?”278 In response, the Principles
recognize three categories of parentage.279 The first is legal parents, a term
that applies to those who are currently classified—typically via a biological
relationship or through formal adoption—as a parent under state law.280 The
Principles, however, do not stop there, but in an attempt to broadly recognize
psychological parentage, propose an additional two categories of
parenthood—“parents by estoppel” and “de facto parents.”
A parent by estoppel is one who, with the permission of the child’s legal
parent, lived with the child for at least two years (or, for children less than two
years of age, since the child’s birth) and assumed “full and permanent
responsibilities as a parent.”281 In contrast, a de facto parent is one who for at
least two years, either as a result of an agreement with the legal parent or
because of that parent’s “complete failure or inability . . . to perform
caretaking functions,” lived with the child and voluntarily performed
caretaking functions equal to the “parent with whom the child primarily
lived.”282 Under the Principles, a parent by estoppel is afforded all the same
274. Id. at 785 (quoting V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 550 (N.J. 2000)); see also Scott v. Scott, 147
S.W.3d 887, 890 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (awarding third-party custody to former partner of biological
mother given that “to remove him from her custody would be detrimental to his welfare”).
275. See Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312, 317 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (“A person standing in loco
parentis to a child is not a ‘parent,’ does not enjoy parental rights, and therefore does not become
an ‘additional parent[]’ . . . .”); Meyer, supra note 45, at 50 (“[A]lthough they may be permitted
to preserve a ‘parent-like’ relationship with the child in this way, these care givers continue to
occupy the status of a nonparent.”).
276. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 5–6, 117–20 (2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
277. Michael R. Clisham & Robin Fretwell Wilson, American Law Institute’s Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution, Eight Years After Adoption: Guiding Principles or Obligatory Footnote?, 42
FAM. L.Q. 573, 573 (2008).
278. Sarah H. Ramsey, Constructing Parenthood for Stepparents: Parents by Estoppel and De
Facto Parents Under the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 285, 291 (2001).
279. PRINCIPLES, supra note 276, § 2.03(1)(a)–(c).
280. Id. § 2.03(1)(a).
281. Id. § 2.03(1)(b)(iv).
282. Id. § 2.03(1)(c)(ii).
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rights and responsibilities as a legal parent.283 De facto parents, on the other
hand, despite being “entitled to preserve established parenting roles
alongside the child’s other parents,”284 are afforded a secondary status under
the Principles. For instance, the Principles prohibit courts from awarding de
facto parents “the majority of custodial responsibility” if a legal parent or a
parent by estoppel objects.285
The ALI’s expansive definition of parenthood is, to put it mildly, quite
controversial and has prompted a number of legal scholars to voice their
concerns.286 However, despite those objections, as one scholar has observed,
“several states have begun to move tentatively in that direction.”287 Maryland,
for example, recently relied on the Principles as just one example of the
growing “decisional and statutory law of other jurisdictions” that prompted it
to reverse its previous stance “and recognize de facto parenthood.”288
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that a de facto parent
could seek visitation, noting “that our position here is in harmony with the
principles recently adopted by the American Law Institute.”289
Nonetheless, no jurisdiction has explicitly adopted the ALI’s approach.
However, with the proliferation of non-traditional child-rearing practices and
the corresponding enlargement of the pool of parental candidates, more and
more courts will likely face situations requiring them to consider, if not the
Principles itself, the underlying issue of when “legal strangers” can claim
parental rights. Indeed, the increasing awareness of psychological parentage,
just like advances in artificial insemination and the formal recognition of
same-sex families, continues to complicate state determinations of parentage.
With no guidance from the nation’s highest court, however, states are likely
to continue resolving claims of parental identity using disparate solutions,

283. See Meyer, supra note 45, at 51 (“Thus, in a custody dispute between an adoptive parent
and a parent by estoppel, neither would enjoy any legal preference over the other.”).
284. Id.
285. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 276, § 2.18(1)(a); see also id. § 2.09(2) (entitling legal parents
and parents by estoppel, but not de facto parents, to a presumption of decisionmaking authority).
286. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 45, at 643 (“The ALI’s custodial scheme . . . is problematic in
several interrelated respects.”); Wilson, supra note 253, at 93 (criticizing the ALI’s “ballooning
definition of parent”); see also Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the
Channelling Function of Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133, 2176 (2007) (“[T]he ALI Principles
have drawn criticism for proposing to recognize certain categories of nonbiological parenthood.”).
287. See Meyer, supra note 45, at 51.
288. Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 451 (Md. 2016) (emphasis omitted) (overruling
Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73 (Md. 2008)).
289. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974–75 (R.I. 2000) (“There, the ALI has recognized
that individuals who have been significantly involved in caring for and supporting children and
for whom they have acted as parents may obtain legal recognition of their parental rights to
visitation and custody.”); see also E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999) (citing the
Principles in support of the court’s decision to treat a biological mother’s former partner as a de
facto parent and thus award visitation).
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thus further conditioning a person’s ability to claim constitutional protections
based on their state citizenship.
IV.

DEFINING TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PARENTHOOD

Constitutional rights are expected to apply uniformly throughout the
United States.290 Indeed, as Professor Jeffrey Parness points out, “[t]here is
general uniformity nationwide, per federal cases, among the criminally
accused, gun toters, and abortion seekers who possess and enforce the same
federal constitutional rights.”291 Absent from that list, however, are parents—
an omission that is fully warranted given that the definition of parent
currently varies from state to state.292 Thus, the constitutional rights that flow
from parenthood are being applied unevenly throughout the country,
frequently in a way that “reflects and perpetuates inequality based on gender
and sexual orientation.”293 It is, of course, entirely unreasonable to expect a
single, uniform definition for determining who qualifies as a parent. As
Professor Buss explains: “Any simple formula—whether based on history,
biology, or biology plus some relationship—that purports to establish to
whom parental rights belong will fail, in some circumstances, to account for
those who constitute a child’s familial core.”294 Accordingly, “[a]
constitutional protection reduced to any such formula will therefore disserve
the important child-rearing interests the Constitution should be construed to
protect.”295
At the same time, however, “it is the nature of a constitution to set outer
limits to legislative competence.”296 Indeed, the Supreme Court has already
indicated through the fathers’ rights cases that there are in fact some lines the
states cannot cross when it comes to defining parenthood.297 For instance, as
David Meyer has pointed out, it seems unlikely that a state could
constitutionally restrict parenthood to adults who meet all three of the
parental criteria—“genetic ties, emotional bonding, and traditional social

290. Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal Laws and the
Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 169 (2009) (“[F]ederal
constitutional rights are understood to extend equally across the land . . . .”).
291. Parness, supra note 45, at 968 (footnotes omitted).
292. See supra Part III.
293. NeJaime, supra note 45, at 2268; see also McClain, supra note 39, at 54 (“Family law in
the United States is not uniform. Among the states are salient differences, sometimes along the
lines of red versus blue states, with red states more closely embracing integrative parenthood and
rejecting forms of family diversity.”).
294. Buss, supra note 45, at 662.
295. Id.
296. Marc A. Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a Defense in
Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789, 798 (1964).
297. See supra Part II.
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consensus”—that seemed to emerge from those cases.298 It is the position of
this Article, however, that the Constitution compels the imposition of
additional limits on the states’ ability to define parenthood. That is not to
suggest, however, that the approaches the states have taken during the Court’s
silence should be disregarded. Instead, there is much in those approaches to
assist the Court in reformulating the test of constitutional parenthood in light
of these new paths to parentage.
What follows, then, are suggestions on how the Court might take what it
has already said on the subject of parental identity—in essence, the biology
plus doctrine299—and update the doctrine to better reflect the reality of 21stcentury parenthood,300 using the intervening state approaches as a guide.
Specifically, the remainder of this Part proposes a more contemporary
definition of constitutional parenthood—one that helps delineate the
boundaries states cannot cross so as to better protect these new forms of
parentage from invidious discrimination. At the same time, however, this
proposal likewise clarifies those areas that should remain subject to state
legislation. The three key tenets of the proposal are: (1) intentional parents
should be afforded the same opportunity as biological parents to develop a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in their children; (2) functional
parenthood should continue to be required in order for that opportunity to
ripen into a fully protected constitutional right; and (3) psychological
parentage, although subject to recognition by the states in ways that do not
infringe the constitutional protections of legal parents, should not alone
qualify as a path to constitutional parenthood.
A. BIOLOGY PLUS INTENT
In Lehr, the Court put forth the biology plus doctrine for determining
parental identity.301 As previously discussed, biology is a strong factor in
determining the parents of a child. Thus far, the Court has not been called
upon to address whether legal parentage can, absent formal adoption,
automatically flow to one who does not have a biological connection. Of
course, the fact that the Court would not yet have gone beyond biology in
defining parental identity is in no way surprising. As its name makes clear, the
biology plus doctrine, as a starting point, assumes the existence of a biological
connection. Moreover, each of the five fathers’ rights cases that developed the
biology plus doctrine were initiated by biological fathers seeking
constitutional protections primarily on the basis of biological connection.
298. Meyer, supra note 45, at 62 (“[I]t seems reasonably clear that denying parental status at
least to adults meeting all three of these markers would cross the line.”).
299. See supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text.
300. As Professor Jennifer Hendricks has argued, “[t]he emergence of new technology does
not mean that courts must reinvent the law of parental status from scratch.” Hendricks, supra
note 15, at 467.
301. See supra notes 100–12 and accompanying text.
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This Article proposes, as an initial step, that biology continue to provide
an individual an “inchoate interest”302 in his or her child—an interest that,
subject to the functional parenthood requirement,303 could very well ripen
into a fully protected liberty interest. However, biology alone cannot be the
sole basis for providing that opportunity. Indeed, if biological parenthood
were the only category that could conceivably qualify as constitutional
parenthood, then egg and sperm donors would have more protections than
the intentional parents on whose behalf the donations were made. A sperm
donor, for example, would have more rights vis-à-vis a child conceived using
his sperm than would the man who is married to the child’s mother and who
always intended to raise the child as his own. To solve this problem, the
standard for constitutional parenthood must also take into consideration the
concept of intentional parenthood—a concept that, as discussed earlier, the
states have already relied upon in a variety of contexts to determine legal
parentage.304 Indeed, just as it has become a key component to parental
identity at the state level, intent must likewise factor into the determination
of constitutional parenthood.
However, like biological parenthood, intentional parenthood alone
should not be dispositive. If intent alone were sufficient to bestow parental
rights, then situations would arise where a genetic parent who was never the
intended parent, but whose contributions went beyond mere gamete
donation, would automatically lose all parental rights. For instance, a
traditional surrogate, who carries her own biological child yet is expected to
surrender that child at birth to the intended parents, would lose the ability to
ever change her mind if intent were the controlling principle.305 In other
words, just as the rapidly evolving family necessitates a revised definition of
constitutional parenthood, it likewise cautions that future definitions not be
too restrictive. As Professor Linda C. McClain noted, “[t]he demographic
changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American
family.”306 She is, of course, correct; and as society continues to evolve and
reproductive technology continues to grow, our understanding of the average
family is likely to become even more elusive. Given then that future
incarnations of the family are likely to involve modes of conception and childrearing that we cannot currently anticipate, flexibility is key when defining
“parenthood.”307

302. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 (1983).
303. See infra Part IV.B.
304. See supra Part III.
305. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1255 (N.J. 1988) (ruling that to enforce the terms of
a surrogacy agreement requiring a surrogate to surrender her parental rights violates her
constitutional rights).
306. McClain, supra note 38, at 50 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000)).
307. See Boucai, supra note 210, at 1125; Buss, supra note 45, at 651 (“We should, then, avoid
assigning distinct constitutional identity rights to any set of individuals based on their particular
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Thus, this Article proposes a “biology plus intent” standard. Under that
test, an individual qualifies as a constitutional parent if that person has both
a biological connection to the child and, prior to the child’s birth, intended to
parent the child. For a parental claimant who does not have a biological
connection to the child, however, he or she can still qualify as a legal parent
if (1) he or she was an intended parent to the child, and (2) there are not
already two individuals who do satisfy both the biology and intent standard.
To illustrate, imagine that two men, married to one another, employ a
gestational surrogate to carry a child that was conceived using sperm from one
of the men and an egg from an anonymous donor. The father who donated
the sperm would, of course, qualify as a parent given that he is both the
biological and the intended parent. It is important to note that the fact that
he meets this standard should not mean the child has only one legal parent.
Indeed, such a conclusion would not only ignore the reality of this child’s
intended family, but also the strong public policy behind recognizing two
legal parents.308 Accordingly, we would look to see if there is an additional
parent, and when doing so, see there is no other claimant who can claim both
biology and intent. As a result, under this proposal, the inquiry would then
shift to whether there is an additional claimant who at least satisfies the intent
requirement, and indeed there is. Specifically, the husband’s status as an
intentional parent would be sufficient to qualify him as the child’s other legal
parent.
Although this proposal does not permit biology alone to serve as a path
to constitutional parenthood, there are some exceptions where biology would
be sufficient by itself. Specifically, intentional parentage would encompass
those who—beyond the act of merely donating sperm or egg—played a
significant role in either the conception or birth of the child. For instance, in
contrast to a sperm donor, a man who fathered a child through sexual
intercourse with the child’s mother could still claim the status of
constitutional parent even if evidence existed that he never intended to be a
parent.309 Likewise, a traditional surrogate would demonstrate the requisite
characteristics.”); Elizabeth Traylor, Protecting the Rights of Children of Same-Sex Parents in Indiana by
Adopting a Version of the Uniform Parentage Act, 48 IND. L. REV. 695, 708 (2015) (“The definition of
‘parent’ has changed dramatically over the past several decades and the law needs to be flexible
in order to accommodate these new family structures.”).
308. See William M. Lopez, Artificial Insemination and the Presumption of Parenthood: Traditional
Foundations and Modern Applications for Lesbian Mothers, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 897, 902 (2011)
(“[T]he best interest of the child is protected when that child has two parents.”); Schiff, supra
note 175, at 285 (noting “the public policy goal of ensuring a stable family unit for the child with
two nurturing and committed parents who legally are responsible for the child’s well-being”); see
also Ellen C. Perrin et al., Gay and Lesbian Issues in Pediatric Health Care, 34 CURRENT PROBS.
PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 355, 378–79 (2004) (“[T]he presence of two parents,
irrespective of their gender or sexual orientation, [is] associated with more positive outcomes for
[a child’s] psychological well-being.”).
309. Thus, nothing in this proposal would alter state courts’ current approach of holding
men financially responsible for their biological children even if those men claim the mother
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intent, by virtue of the fact that she not only donated her eggs but also
gestated the child for nine months, thus preserving her maternal rights until
such time as a legal adoption can take place. Finally, as used in this proposal,
an intentional parent refers to one who formed that intent prior to the child’s
birth and with the assent of the child’s other legal parent. For those who come
into a child’s life after the child’s birth or those whose intent was at odds with
that of the child’s other legal parent, such claims should instead be
adjudicated pursuant to the standards regarding psychological parentage,
discussed below.310
Despite these caveats, the intent standard might nonetheless appear to
suggest quite a departure from the existing parameters of constitutional
parenthood. In actuality, however, this proposal is not so much of a departure,
but a more thoughtful encapsulation of the Supreme Court’s existing
jurisprudence on parentage. The Court’s recent decision in Obergefell v.
Hodges, which defined the fundamental right to marry to encompass same-sex
marriage, is instructive.311 Both marriage and parenthood are unenumerated
rights, yet both have been recognized as fundamental liberty interests, subject
to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. When the Court was called
upon to define marriage, it noted that, despite the fact that same-sex marriage
was absent from this country’s history and traditions, the essence of that right
nonetheless demanded that it be extended to same-sex couples.312
Specifically, the Court ruled that those justifications underlying the
fundamental right to marry “apply with equal force to same-sex couples.”313
Similarly, an examination of how the Court has defined “parent” for purposes
of the corresponding fundamental right reveals three facets of constitutional

misled them as to her ability to have a child. See Jill E. Evans, In Search of Paternal Equity: A Father’s
Right to Pursue a Claim of Misrepresentation of Fertility, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1045, 1075 & n.147
(2005) (listing cases that represent the “universal rejection of affirmative defenses or
counterclaims alleging fraud in paternity or support actions”); Michelle Oberman, Sex, Lies, and
the Duty to Disclose, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 891–92 (2005) (summarizing courts’ approaches to cases
where one partner did not disclose or misrepresented his or her fertility status). Of course, it
bears mentioning that the purpose of this Article is to address the question of who may avail
themselves to the protections of constitutional parenthood, not who the state can treat as a parent
for purposes of holding them liable for child support. This is a key distinction given that the law
does not currently treat those two categories of parents equally. See Hendricks, supra note 15, at
465 (“Some separation already exists under Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, which, to date,
requires parents to ‘earn’ their parental rights (by gestation and birth, marriage, or biology-plusrelationship) but does not seem to limit the state’s ability to impose parenthood on a much lesser
showing (often biology or relationship).”).
310. See infra Part IV.C.
311. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
312. As the Court made clear in Lawrence v. Texas, “history and tradition are the starting point
but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
313. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
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parenthood that likewise mandate the inclusion of intentional parentage in
that definition.
1. The Limited Role of Biology
The Court has already made clear that biology is by no means the
touchstone of parenthood. In Lehr, for instance, the Supreme Court
announced that, when it comes to legal parentage, “the mere existence of a
biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection.”314
Additionally, as Justice Stevens remarked in Caban, “[p]arental rights do not
spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child.
They require relationships more enduring.”315 The Court’s decisions in those
cases shed even more light on the limited role biology plays in the resolution
of parental identity claims. In Quilloin, for example, the Court was confronted
with a Georgia adoption statute that required the consent of a nonmarital
mother, but not a nonmarital father.316 The Court upheld the statute, finding
that it “did not deprive appellant of his asserted rights under the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses.”317 Thus, the Court did not hold that Quilloin’s
constitutional rights were outweighed by the state’s interest, but instead that
he had no constitutional rights in the first place.318 Indeed, one commentator
has characterized Quilloin as “reflect[ing] not a curtailment of parental rights,
but rather a minimization of the role of biology in assigning those rights.”319
Not only has the court discounted the role of biology, but in Michael H., it
held that the state of California could constitutionally recognize as the legal
father a man, who had no biological connection with the child, simply by
virtue of the fact that he was married to the mother.320 Thus, to now propose
a rule in which biology alone is not dispositive of parenthood is entirely
consistent with what the Court has previously indicated about the
constitutional dimensions of parenthood.
2. The Historical Link Between Parental Identity and Intact Families
Further support for the proposition that constitutional parenthood must
include considerations of intent can be found in the nation’s history of linking
314. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).
315. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting). In Lehr, the
Court would adopt this language from Stevens’s dissent as the controlling standard. Lehr, 463
U.S. at 260.
316. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 246–47 (1978); see supra notes 84–93 and accompanying
text.
317. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
318. See Buss, supra note 45, at 659 (“Indeed, it never suggested that Mr. Quilloin had any
constitutionally protected right whatsoever.”).
319. Id.; see also Dolgin, supra note 15, at 654 (“The Court in Quilloin, retreating from the
more expansive implications of Stanley, explicitly refused constitutional protection to unwed
fathers on the basis of biological paternity alone . . . .”).
320. See supra notes 120–27 and accompanying text.
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marriage and parental identity. As Douglas NeJaime has explained, “[f]amily
law increasingly deemed married individuals to be legal parents based not on
presumed biological connections to their children, but rather on the
deliberate parent-child relationships formed inside the marital family.”321
Indeed, one of the unifying threads in the fathers’ rights cases was the Court’s
desire to give effect to intact families.322 In fact, it is this theme that has led
many, when synthesizing the various holdings in the fathers’ rights cases, to
suggest that the nonmarital father’s relationship with the mother must be
taken into account.323
The plurality in Michael H. provides perhaps the best example of this
approach when it held that “our traditions have protected the marital family”
from claims of an “outsider” even if that person happens to be the child’s
biological father.324 In the absence of marriage, the Court has still indicated a
preference for awarding the title of “parent” to those who took part in a
marriage-like relationship with the child’s other parent. In Caban, for
example, the Court ruled that it was a violation of equal protection to permit
nonmarital mothers, but not nonmarital fathers, to withhold consent to the
adoption of their children.325 It is true, of course, that the nonmarital father
prevailed largely because he had, unlike the nonmarital fathers in Quilloin
and Lehr, played an active role in his children’s lives.326 However, as Janet
Dolgin has persuasively argued, the decision in Caban also seems to be heavily
influenced by the fact that the nonmarital father had lived with both the
mother and the children “as a natural family”327:
Technically, the term “natural family” was used in Caban to refer to
a social unit of unmarried biological parents and their children.
However, the term carried additional implications. The term
“family” refers, of course, to a comparable unit involving two
married adults. “Natural family” is the marked term. The normal,

321. NeJaime, supra note 14, at 1188 (emphasis added).
322. See, e.g., In re Raquel Marie X, 559 N.E.2d 418, 424–25 (N.Y. 1990) (“Notably, in Lehr
and Quilloin, the Supreme Court also emphasized that the result of permitting stepfather
adoptions would be legal recognition of a de facto family already in existence, a State interest it
viewed as outweighing the parental interests of the fathers who had not grasped the opportunity
to solidify their relationships with their children.”); Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller
v Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 29 (“Lehr may more generally be viewed as an expression of the
Court’s solicitousness toward placement of children with intact nuclear families.”).
323. See supra note 132 and accompanying text; see also MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 85 (1995) (“[T]he
more the unwed family looked and functioned like a traditional family, the more secure the
father’s claims seemed to be.”).
324. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989).
325. See supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
327. Dolgin, supra note 15, at 657 (quoting Caban v. Moham, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979).
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ideal family can be described without use of the adjective “natural.”
That adjective is used to delineate a special, marginal family group.
In this regard, therefore, Caban differed from the traditional
position that to achieve legal recognition, a family must include two
adults married to each other. But the decision did not eliminate
altogether the presence of “family” as a basic precondition for the
protection of a biological father’s legal paternity.328
Thus, although Caban recognized that formal marriage was no longer a
requirement to create a family, parental identity did nonetheless flow, at least
in part, from a relationship that bore some resemblance to marriage.329
Given, then, the goal of protecting established family units, intentional
parenthood is a required component of any modern definition of
constitutional parenthood. Failure to do so would allow an outsider to
interfere with an existing family unit simply by virtue of a biological
connection to a child in that family—a scenario the Court has explicitly
rejected. For example, when the Court dismissed the biological father’s
attempts in Quilloin to veto a step-parent adoption, it did so in part because
“the result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family
unit already in existence.”330 With that in mind, consider an infertile couple that
uses the services of a sperm donor, an egg donor and a gestational surrogate
to successfully conceive a child. Of these five people, only the intentional
parents, the infertile couple, are likely to represent an existing family unit.
Thus, an approach that considers both biological and intentional parenthood
would permit the commissioning couple to qualify not only as the intentional
parents, but also as the legal parents. In contrast, the other three contributors
have no connection to the child other than gestation or gamete donation.
Thus, any other decision would disperse the child’s legal parentage over
individuals from unrelated families, an approach the Court has repeatedly
declined to adopt when dealing with cases involving parental identity.331 As
one scholar has noted, the “societal interest [in protecting children] is
necessarily impaired if the child’s legal parentage is split—possibly following
protracted litigation—between two individuals who never intended to form a
family.”332

328. Id. at 658 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
329. See Hendricks, supra note 15, at 445 (“Conservatives and feminists alike have proposed
an alternative reading of the unwed father cases: that these cases are about protecting the
traditional/nuclear/patriarchal family, not promoting sex equality . . . .”).
330. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (emphasis added).
331. See supra Part II.
332. Schiff, supra note 175, at 285.
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3. The Importance of Safeguarding Familial Equality
The Court has often expressed a desire to treat families and parents
equally. To ensure equal protection of nontraditional families, this new test
for parentage is necessary. A recurring theme in the fathers’ rights cases is
that a state cannot unduly discriminate when it comes to defining
parenthood.333 This conclusion, of course, is hardly revolutionary in light of
the protections already afforded by the Equal Protection clause. Nonetheless,
looking to the fathers’ rights cases, an additional dimension of antidiscrimination seems to be at play. Specifically, the fundamental right of
parents is just one of several rights bundled together in the Court’s broader
recognition of familial privacy, a category that likewise includes abortion,
contraception, and, essentially, the decision whether to have children.334 The
fathers’ rights cases, in fact, evidence this commitment to safeguarding the
right to reproductive freedom. Consider for instance, Stanley, where the Court
struck down state attempts to automatically classify nonmarital fathers as unfit
parents.335 In ruling as it did, the Court took pains to point out its reverence
for both the family itself and more specifically an individual’s right to start a
family: “The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family.
The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed
‘essential,’ ‘basic civil rights of man,’ and ‘[r]ights far more precious . . . than
property rights.’”336 Such language harkens back to language used by the
Court in Meyer v. Nebraska, the first case to recognize the fundamental right of
parents.337 There, when discussing the definition of “liberty” as that term is
used in the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court noted that, “[w]ithout doubt,
it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the

333. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (“[T]his . . . distinction
between unwed mothers and unwed fathers, applicable in all circumstances where adoption of a
child of theirs is at issue, does not bear a substantial relationship to the State’s asserted
interests.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (“[D]enying such a hearing to Stanley
and those like him while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal
Protection Clause.”).
334. See Meyer, supra note 55, at 528 (“Rights to abortion, contraception, marriage, kinship,
and the custody and rearing of children have, for the most part, sprung up independently of one
another, only later converging into a loosely recognized constellation of ‘family privacy’ rights.”);
Nancy B. Shernow, Comment, Recognizing Constitutional Rights of Custodial Parents: The Primacy of
the Post-Divorce Family in Child Custody Modification Proceedings, 35 UCLA L. REV. 677, 701–02
(1988) (“The Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right of family privacy that protects
‘marriage, procreation, contraception, abortion, family relationships, and the rearing and
education of children’ from state interference.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Developments in the
Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1161 (1980))).
335. See supra notes 74–84 and accompanying text.
336. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (citations omitted).
337. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923); see Meyer, supra note 55, at 533
(describing Meyer and Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) as being “now regarded as
the foundational family privacy cases”).
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individual to [among other things,] establish a home and bring up
children.”338
Thus, for constitutional parenthood to fully protect the right of
contemporary Americans to not only have children, but also to qualify as those
children’s legal parents, intentional parenthood must be taken into account.
After all, for a variety of reasons, many families simply would not exist but for
the reproductive assistance of third parties.339 The most obvious example
would be an infertile couple who—unless they wish to “engag[e] in the timeconsuming, costly, and invasive process of adopti[on]”340—must resort to
assisted reproduction to have children. If there were no room for intent to
factor into the determination of constitutional parenthood, those couples
would never be afforded the constitutional protections of parenthood—
protections enjoyed as a matter of course by those couples who are capable of
biologically reproducing on their own. As Douglas NeJaime has persuasively
argued, “equality requires treating those traditionally excluded from the
parentage regime as full participants.”341
Indeed, Obergefell itself represents a particularly timely example of the
Court’s commitment to family equality.342 When ruling that states cannot
constitutionally define marriage in such a way as to exclude same-sex couples,
Justice Kennedy justified that decision on a number of grounds, but one of
which was the fact that “hundreds of thousands of children are presently
being raised by [same-sex] couples.”343 In light of that fact, the Court ruled
that same-sex marriage should be afforded constitutional protection given
that “[m]arriage also affords the permanency and stability important to
children’s best interests.”344 This language would echo what the Court said
two years earlier in United States v. Windsor.345 There, when talking about the
impact of DOMA on same-sex families, the Court referenced the children of
338. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
339. See supra Part III.A–B. Douglas NeJaime describes the situation many found themselves
in prior to the development of ART:
For centuries, individuals who aspired to parenthood as a meaningful life project
had their desires frustrated. Women who could not become pregnant or carry a
pregnancy to term, as well as men who suffered from infertility, would live without
the families they imagined. Adoption became widespread over the course of the
twentieth century and offered a path to parenthood for some, but many either had
their attempts rejected by restrictive adoption regimes or simply decided to forego
parenting without the possibility of biological children . . . . In the late twentieth
century, assisted reproductive technologies (ART) offered new hope to these
individuals . . . .
NeJaime, supra note 45, at 2285.
340. NeJaime, supra note 45, at 2264.
341. Id. at 2332.
342. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2588–91 (2015).
343. Id. at 2600.
344. Id.
345. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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those families: “[I]t humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised
by same-sex couples. The law in question makes it even more difficult for the
children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family.”346
The recognition and dignity that both Windsor and Obergefell attempted
to provide same-sex families, however, now risks being taken away as states
adopt restrictive definitions of “parenthood”—definitions that require samesex couples to meet additional, more onerous requirements simply to qualify
as legal parents to the children who comprise their family.347 Thus, to protect
these families from such invidious discrimination, the Court must incorporate
an intent standard into the test for constitutional parenthood. Doing so would
allow same-sex couples, along with individuals who utilize assisted
reproduction, to make the decision to start a family, safe in the knowledge
that they will be afforded the same constitutional protections as other
families.348
In sum, although the Court has thus far only dealt with parental identity
cases concerning biological parenthood, what the Court has said about the
subject of parental identity makes clear that intentional parenthood is
required in order to achieve the underlying objectives of constitutional
parenthood.
B. FUNCTIONAL PARENTHOOD
In proposing that the constitutional definition of parent encompass both
biology and intent, this Article does not mean to suggest that an individual
may attain constitutional parenthood merely by satisfying those two criteria.
As David Meyer has described, “[v]irtually all conceptions of parenthood
rights proceed on the assumption that they are only prima facie or
presumptive.”349 That is precisely the approach the Supreme Court has taken

346. Id. at 2694.
347. Typically that requirement will be formal adoption, a step that opposite-sex partners
need not follow to qualify as a parent. See supra Part III.B.
348. In fact, the Court recently affirmed its position in Obergefell that, when it comes to
married couples, the Constitution does not permit the states to discriminate on the basis of family
composition. In Pavan v. Smith, the Court issued a summary reversal of an opinion by the
Supreme Court of Arkansas applying the marital presumption to heterosexual couples but not
homosexual couples. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077–79 (2017); see supra note 132 and
accompanying text. Specifically, when it came to children who were the product of artificial
insemination, the state issued birth certificates to married, opposite-sex couples bearing the
names of both spouses, even if the husband was not the biological father. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at
2077. For married couples that were of the same sex, however, the state would only issue birth
certificates bearing the name of the biological parent. Id. In ruling as it did, the Court did not
address constitutional parenthood, but the Court did hold that the state must afford all married
couples, whether same-sex or opposite-sex, the same benefits of marriage: “The State uses those
certificates to give married parents a form of legal recognition that is not available to unmarried
parents. Having made that choice, Arkansas may not, consistent with Obergefell, deny married
same-sex couples that recognition.” Id. at 2078–79.
349. Meyer, supra note 132, at 136.
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in the past when it held that, although a nonmarital father gains an
“opportunity” to develop a parental relationship with his child by virtue of a
biological connection, that opportunity does not ripen into a constitutionally
protected liberty interest unless the man affirmatively “comes forward to
participate in the rearing of his child.”350 Under this Article’s proposed
definition, functional parenthood would continue to play a crucial role in the
determination of whether an individual has perfected the full constitutional
rights of a parent. An individual who has both a biological connection to the
child and was the child’s intended parent would have an opportunity
analogous to what the Court identified in Lehr. However, that person would
still need to come forward and effectively parent the child in order to qualify
as a parent subject to full constitutional protection.
It is important to note, however, that in the past the Supreme Court has
implied that men and women, given their differing levels of involvement in
human reproduction, may be treated differently when it comes to functional
parenthood:
Biology, in short, gives men options. An unwed biological father may
establish a relationship with his biological child and with that child’s
mother through appropriate behavior and become a legal father.
Alternatively, he may treat the biological relationship as irrelevant
and not become a father at all. . . . Mothers, wed or unwed, do not
have the same choices. The Supreme Court implied that for
mothers, parental rights do spring from a biological, though not
from a genetic, connection between parent and child. Biology gives
men the chance to become fathers. However, it inexorably makes
women mothers.351
By retaining the functional requirement in the proposed definition of
constitutional parenthood, this Article does not suggest or endorse deviating
from this understanding when it comes to women who are both the biological
and the gestational mother. In short, “the process of growing a fetus, laboring,
and delivering a child”352 that biological mothers undertake is, in contrast to
the role played by biological fathers, likely sufficient by itself to fulfill the
functional parenthood requirement.353
Nonetheless, in light of the refined test of constitutional parenthood for
assisted reproduction, women who do not play both the biological and
350. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380, 392 (1979)).
351. Dolgin, supra note 15, at 661 (footnotes omitted).
352. Hendricks, supra note 15, at 469; see also Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The
Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1416 (1992) (describing biological fathers as
“volunteers” and biological mothers as “draftees”).
353. But see Hendricks, supra note 15, at 470–71 (noting how, in subsequent cases, some of
the justices suggested “that a new mother, . . . like the unwed fathers in Stanley and Lehr, might
have no parental rights until she takes additional steps to establish a post-birth relationship”).
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getational roles might now be required to demonstrate functional
parenthood as a requirement to gaining full constitutional protections.
Consider for instance, an intended mother and father who use a gestational
surrogate to carry a child conceived using third-party sperm and egg donors.
Under the proposed standard, no individual would satisfy the biology plus
intent requirement. Accordingly, a court would then look solely to who
intended to parent the child, which would mean that the commissioning
couple would be the legal parents. Nonetheless, both would still need to
function as parents prior to achieving full constitutional status. After all,
unlike traditional procreation, the mother and father in this scenario would
be similarly situated vis-à-vis their biological involvement in the child’s birth.
The same would be true if the surrogate was implanted with an egg from the
intended mother that had been fertilized by sperm from the intended
father.354 The commissioning couple would still qualify as the legal parents
given that both would now satisfy the biology plus intent requirement, but
both would still need to come forward and accept that role for it to fully ripen
into the corresponding constitutional right. Again, in this scenario, the
mother and father are similarly situated in that both played the same biological
role in the birth of the child—they both donated the required gametes—and
nothing more.355
Most individuals who satisfy the biology plus intent standard would, one
would assume, eagerly avail themselves of the opportunity to foster the
requisite parent-child relationship with their offspring. Thus, the functional
parenthood requirement should not be considered a hurdle that caring
parents must jump through in order to secure the protections of
constitutional parenthood. Instead, the requirement protects children from
presumptive parents holding them hostage while refusing to parent the child
and refusing to allow anyone else to legally assume that role. That precise
situation was what confronted the Court in both Quilloin and Lehr, where a
nonmarital, biological father, despite not participating in his child’s life,
refused to consent to the child’s adoption by another man.356 In both cases,
the Court deemed the fathers’ consent irrelevant given that neither had
fulfilled the role of functional parent.357 In short, the Court’s approach to
parental identity, which is retained in the proposal here, has been one that

354. This was precisely the fact pattern presented in Johnson v. Calvert. Johnson v. Calvert,
851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993).
355. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in
the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 277 (2006) (“[R]elying on intent to determine
parentage holds promise for freeing family law from gender stereotypes and assumptions about
biology as destiny. An intent-based test puts males and females on equal footing, offsetting rather
than reinforcing biological sex differences.” (footnotes omitted)).
356. See supra notes 84–92, 100–12 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 84–92, 100–12 and accompanying text.
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provides the state with greater options to find parents for children whose
current “parents” are refusing to fulfill the obligations of that role.
That being said, in requiring parents to come forward and demonstrate
their commitment to the child, the above examples assume that the intended
mother(s) and father(s) had the opportunity to do just that. What about
parents who would have parented the child but were unaware, through no
fault of their own, that they even had a biological child? The classic example
would be a nonmarital father who never learned that he had a child because
the mother gave birth in secret and immediately put the child up for
adoption.358 In light of assisted reproduction technology, however, a similar
scenario could now happen involving mothers. Assume that a married couple
used their genetic material to create fertilized eggs, which they stored for
possible future use. The couple subsequently divorces, and the husband
implants one of the eggs in a gestational surrogate without informing his
former wife.359 In that case, the biological mother had previously expressed
an intent, by virtue of harvesting and storing the fertilized eggs, to be a
mother. Yet because of the husband’s deceit, the mother is now denied an
opportunity to come forward and affirmatively demonstrate that
commitment.360 How, then, would that incapacity impact her ability to claim
constitutional parenthood? Sadly, the Supreme Court has issued no
substantive guidance on this issue, merely asking whether the law “adequately
protected [the parents’] opportunity to form such a relationship.”361
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to suggest how this issue should
be resolved, it is clear that the societal changes discussed herein have not only
exacerbated determinations of constitutional parenthood, they have likewise
made more compelling the question of what steps a state must take in order
to protect a parent’s opportunity to become a functional parent.

358. See Michael J. Higdon, Marginalized Fathers and Demonized Mothers: A Feminist Look at the
Reproductive Freedom of Unmarried Men, 66 ALA. L. REV. 507, 527–31 (2015) (giving examples of
“thwarted fathers”).
359. Indeed, a number of women have had their eggs implanted in others without their
consent. See Stone v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1999) (“[H]uman
eggs were taken from one patient and implanted in another without the consent of the donor.”);
see also Judith D. Fischer, Misappropriation of Human Eggs and Embryos and the Tort of Conversion: A
Relational View, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 381, 397–402 (1999) (discussing instances of stolen eggs).
360. See Molly Miller, Note, Embryo Adoption: The Solution to an Ambiguous Intent Standard, 94
MINN. L. REV. 869, 882–83 (2010) (“Further, the biology-based standards do not protect embryo
creators from having their embryos stolen and implanted without their consent. In contrast, an
intent standard would overcome the barriers that biology imposes by being more broadly
applicable.” (footnote omitted)).
361. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263 (1983).
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C. PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENTAGE AND STATE AUTONOMY
As indicated above, this Article proposes that functional parenthood
continue to play a role in the constitutional definition of parent.362 It does not
suggest, however, allowing functional parentage—absent biology and
intent—to independently qualify as a basis for constitutional parenthood.
This limitation does not mean to suggest that states cannot continue to
recognize psychological parentage for purposes of awarding parental
rights,363 but only that this variety of parentage would not by itself entitle one
to the constitutional protections associated with legal parenthood.
Such an approach is essential in order to safeguard the states’ interest in
protecting families. After all, an overly prescriptive definition of constitutional
parenthood can, in the words of Professor Elizabeth Patterson, lead to
“changes in state law that could disrupt the fabric of family law and policy in
a state. Because family policy is so closely connected to community norms and
local social cohesion, such disruptions can have deleterious social effects
. . . .”364 For instance, the recognition of psychological parenthood would
mean that, given there is no limit to the number of individuals who could
claim that status, more than two people could now share parental rights to a
single child.365 Although some have indeed proposed lifting the current
quantitative limitation,366 it is the position of this Article that such decisions
should be left to the individual states and, for a variety of reasons, not
enshrined into constitutional law.
First, unlike an intent requirement, which the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence already supports as a necessary addition to the test for parental
identity,367 nothing in the Court’s history supports any model of family in
which there are more than two legal parents. Second, psychological parentage
typically arises when one who is neither a biological nor an intentional parent
subsequently enters a child’s life and begins acting as a parent.368 Given this
factual context, the equality concerns that militated against excluding
intentional parents from the definition of constitutional parenthood no

362. See supra Part IV.B.
363. See supra Part III.C.
364. Elizabeth G. Patterson, Unintended Consequences: Why Congress Should Tread Lightly When
Entering the Field of Family Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 399 (2008).
365. See Buss, supra note 45, at 640–41 (describing the approach of the ALI Principles as
“encourag[ing] courts to draw additional claimants into the custodial circle . . . [in such a way
that] the court can proliferate custodial fragments among individuals to whom the law assigns, at
best, qualified parental identity and responsibility”).
366. Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 50 (2007)
(advocating that “the numerosity requirement that a child shall have no more than two parents”
be lifted).
367. See supra Part IV.A.
368. See supra Part III.C.
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longer exist.369 After all, intentional parenthood protects the subset of families
who must resort to some version of assisted reproduction to even have
children. Given that psychological parentage, however, would arise only after
the child has already been born, those concerns are not present. Further, a
psychological parent who desires a legal relationship with a parentless child
can turn to adoption—an option that most “parents” in that situation would
likely assume was required in order to become a legal parent.370 In contrast,
as Douglas NeJaime has pointed out, those parents who intended to parent a
child before that child was even born are more likely to be “ignorant of the
need to adopt their own child.”371 Thus, intentional parents, unlike
psychological parents, are typically going to be more in need of the
protections that constitutional parenthood affords.372 Finally, any decision to
expand the number of individuals who can claim parental rights could result
in harm to the child, who is now subject to the control of multiple individuals.
As one scholar aptly points out, “[t]he best interests of the child are not served
by granting rights to more and more parental claimants or by creating new
varieties of constitutionally protected parenthood.”373
Thus, decisions about whether to recognize psychological parentage
should be left to state law with the understanding that any such recognition is
independent of constitutional parenthood. In fact, such an approach is
consistent with what the states themselves are already doing. Specifically, the
states that have thus far offered this recognition have done so not on the basis
of protecting “the proprietary interests of the parent as a rights-holder,”374 but
instead as a means of protecting the best interest of children who have come
to rely on these extra-parental relationships.375 Indeed, when recognizing
psychological parentage, courts have used that status merely as a means of
awarding parental rights, not bestowing legal parenthood.376 As the Supreme
Court has previously recognized, areas such as this are best handled by the
state courts given that they “are more eminently suited to work of this type

369. See supra notes 330–46 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 254–61 and accompanying text. One of the reasons the court in that case
refused to recognize the petitioner as an “equitable parent” was because he was aware “at all times
that he would have to formally adopt William in order to be his legal parent.” In re Marriage of
Mancine, 9 N.E. 3d 550, 566, 568 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
371. NeJaime, supra note 45, at 2320 (emphasis added).
372. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 541 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (“Some of this may be so ‘in most cases’ and, it is to be hoped, in judges’ own and
other warm and protected, nurturing family environments. But those ‘most cases’ need not rely
on constitutional protections that are so vital for others.”); Suzanna Sherry, Original Sin, 84 NW.
U. L. REV. 1215, 1219 (1990) (noting the importance of “extending substantive constitutional
protections to those most in need of the judiciary’s assistance”).
373. SHULMAN, supra note 44, at 205.
374. Id. at 14.
375. See supra notes 271, 273 and accompanying text.
376. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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than are federal courts, which lack the close association with state and local
government organizations dedicated to handling issues that arise out of
conflicts over divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.”377 The same
cannot be said, however, when it comes to advocating for a more robust
constitutional definition of parenthood. As Professor Jeffrey Parness has
argued, “the more particular articulation of who are federal constitutional
childcare rightholders, without determining which parent has custody,
visitation, parenting time, or the like, should prompt no concerns over later
monitoring, implicate no ties to local government organizations, nor require
judicial expertise developed only in state courts.”378
Admittedly, the extent to which the states can navigate in this area
remains somewhat unclear.379 After all, any parental rights afforded a third
party would necessarily impact the fundamental rights of the legal parents “to
make decisions concerning their children.”380 Although a full analysis of this
issue is beyond the discrete focus of this Article, the Supreme Court has
indicated that the states do have some ability to award third-party visitation,
albeit the boundaries of that ability are still far from certain.381 The point here
is merely that, to the extent parental rights can constitutionally be extended
to third parties, that decision should not emanate from the definition of
constitutional parenthood, but should instead be retained by the states. As
one scholar succinctly put it, “[b]asic rights inevitably require some diversity in
parenthood but do not compel public acquiescence in whatever child care
arrangements adults may agree upon.”382

377. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992); see also Buss, supra note 45, at
652–53 (noting ways in which the state is “uniquely qualified” and has “superior competence” in
resolving such issues).
378. Parness, supra note 45, at 983.
379. Although the Court has weighed in on the constitutionality of third-party visitation
statutes in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), “[t]he Court’s six opinions [in that case] left a
great deal of uncertainty for states that want to allow non-parental visitation orders.” Hendricks,
supra note 15, at 455.
380. Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn’t Know Best: Quasi-Parents and Parental
Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865, 877 (2003).
381. See Meyer, supra note 20, at 867 (noting that Troxel “limits state power to redefine the
substantive prerogatives accorded parents, but does not ‘place any constitutional limitations on
the ability of states to legislatively, or through their common law, define a parent or family’”
(quoting In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 178 (Wash. 2005))); Meyer, supra note 132, at
133 (noting how, with Troxel, “the Supreme Court has signaled a growing receptiveness to
extending constitutional protection to the independent relational interests of children”); Adam
Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts,
59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 864 n.324 (2006) (“Troxel has led to an avalanche of state court litigation
over the constitutionality of child custody and visitation laws.”).
382. Meyer, supra note 132, at 125.
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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court recently noted that “[t]he states are laboratories for
experimentation, but those experiments may not deny the basic dignity the
Constitution protects.”383 Unfortunately, that is precisely the current state of
the law as it applies to parental identity. Given the Supreme Court’s sustained
silence on the subject, the states have individually undertaken the difficult
task of defining parenthood, a status that brings with it significant
constitutional protections. As a consequence, two distinct harms have
emerged. First, a person’s ability to avail herself to the constitutional
protections associated with parenthood now varies depending on the state in
which she happens to live. Second, some states have defined parenthood in
such a restrictive manner that certain kinds of families are effectively
precluded from ever enjoying those protections. As discussed herein, the
solution to both problems begins with the Supreme Court. The Court itself
acknowledged this responsibility when it said, “we cannot leave to the States
the formulation of the authoritative laws, rules, and remedies designed to
protect people from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed
rights.”384 Instead, when it comes to such rights, “it is our responsibility to
protect by fashioning the necessary rule.”385 Thus, it is time for the Court to
return to the subject of constitutional parenthood and provide a more
contemporary definition—one that, at a minimum, both recognizes and
protects the rights of intentional parents. Only by doing so will the Court
adequately safeguard the constitutional rights of the ever-evolving American
family.

383.
384.
385.

Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014).
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967).
Id.
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